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I.

INTRODUCTION

Although a procedural rule, the demand requirement in derivative
litigation is one of the most consequential doctrines in corporate law. 1 Its
touchstone, for Delaware law, is the decision in Aronson v. Lewis, 2 in
which the Supreme Court established a test for determining whether
shareholder demand is futile and therefore unnecessary. 3 This Article
contends that the Aronson test is flawed. Its test for demand futility, in
certain circumstances, overly restricts board authority. Furthermore, it
encourages rational boards to delegate more corporate decision-making to
management and board committees than they would otherwise. The
Aronson test, venerable as it is, ought to be refashioned.
Because of the demand requirement, shareholders may not
independently pursue legal action on behalf of a corporation and must
instead “demand” that the corporation’s board of directors initiate
litigation. 4 The demand requirement is a natural outgrowth of the authority
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace School of Law. This article reflects helpful
comments from Barnali Choudhury, Jim Fishman, John Reed, Donald Wolfe, Jr., and the
participants of faculty workshops at Pace Law School and the University of Akron School
of Law.
1. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 386 (2002)
(“Although the demand requirement looks like a mere procedural formality, it has evolved
into the central substantive rule of derivative litigation.”).
2. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
3. At least one commentator has opined that Aronson is one of the two most influential
Delaware corporate law cases. See Posting of Brett McDonnell to The Conglomerate,
Influential
Corporate
and
Securities
Law
Cases,
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/03/influential-cor.html#comments (last visited Mar.
2, 2008).
4. See DEL. CT. C.P.R. 23.1 (“In a derivative action brought by one or more
shareholders or members to enforce a right of a corporation or of an unincorporated
association, the corporation or association having failed to enforce a right which may
properly be asserted by it, the complaint shall . . . allege with particularity the efforts, if any,
made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff desires from the directors or
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that corporate law vests in the board to make corporate decisions, including
litigation decisions. Boards are then free, within the boundaries of their
fiduciary duties, to determine whether to accept or refuse the demand.
Demand is not required, though, if it would be futile to ask a board to
initiate the relevant lawsuit. This futility exception allows board authority
to be overridden under certain circumstances in order that fiduciary duties
remain enforceable.
Aronson held that demand is futile when there is reasonable doubt
that, inter alia, the underlying board decision was the product of a valid
business judgment. 5 Throughout this Article, that underlying board
decision is referred to as the “Original Decision,” while a board’s decision
to accept or reject the demand (assuming it is made by plaintiffs) is referred
to as the “Demand Decision.” Although Aronson examines the Original
Decision, it does so not because all bad Original Decisions are necessarily
appropriate subjects for legal action by the corporation. Rather, Aronson
looks to the merits of the Original Decision when there is reason to doubt
directors’ ability to make an impartial Demand Decision if the Original
Decision was bad, i.e., if they might face personal liability because of the
Original Decision. 6
By asking this directorial bias question indirectly through the “valid
business judgment” inquiry, Aronson opened a space between its principle
(predicting demand futility by examining the likelihood of board partiality)
and its test. This space became more than theoretical when the Delaware
legislature permitted corporations to adopt exculpation clauses. 7 These
clauses have been adopted by the vast majority of Delaware corporations, 8
and serve to immunize directors from personal liability for breaches of their
duty of care. But exculpation has no bearing on whether an Original
Decision was the product of a “valid business judgment.” In duty of care
cases, then, the link between demand futility’s motivating principle and
Aronson’s test is severed. Directors who face no personal liability will
nevertheless be presumed incapable of judging demand fairly.

comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s failure to obtain the action or for not
making the effort.”).
5. 473 A.2d at 814.
6. See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 (explaining the court’s review process under the
business judgment rule); Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 500 (Del. Ch. 2003) (focusing
on the second prong of the Aronson test).
7. Delaware’s exculpation statute is found at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7).
8. See Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Disney, Good Faith, and Structural Bias,
32 J. CORP. L. 833, 837 (2007) (stating that while liability for bad faith decisions and loyalty
violations cannot be waived, “personal liability for pure care violations” can be and have
been waived by most corporations); Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public
and Private Faces of Derivative Suits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1786 (2004) (“It is very rare
for a public company not to have taken advantage of this exculpation.”).
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Given corporate law’s presumption of directorial authority over
everyday corporate matters, Aronson’s demand futility test is puzzling. It
effectively allocates authority over corporate litigation decisions to
shareholders despite the fact that there is no explicit reason to distrust
directorial decision-making. Aronson might conceivably be defended
against this charge if either (1) its imposition upon directorial authority is
de minimis or (2) there exist biases other than potential monetary liability
that infect directorial decision-making. Yet both of these defenses create as
many issues for Delaware law as they solve.
Moreover, Aronson is problematic for reasons other than its
reallocation of authority within the firm. Because Aronson logically
requires that the basis of the derivative suit be some sort of action by the
board, 9 Delaware courts were forced to adopt a different test for fiduciary
duty claims against directors based on their failures to act. The Supreme
Court did so in Rales v. Blasband which established a test for demand
futility based explicitly on a prediction of a board’s ability to make an
impartial Demand Decision. 10 Rales’ direct approach, unlike Aronson’s,
takes into account exculpation clauses and thereby allows less-involved
boards to more effectively use those clauses as a shield for certain
derivative claims at the demand stage. That is, the Delaware Supreme
Court has adopted a non-neutral approach as between board action and
board delegation. When faced with a set of decisions with a high litigation
risk profile—especially risk involving the duty of care—rational boards
find themselves better off, from a demand futility perspective, delegating
the matters to board committees or employees, thereby avoiding the
problems associated with Aronson’s failure to take exculpation clauses into
account.
Part II of this Article describes the demand requirement and its
theoretical foundations. Part III describes the different tests for demand
futility under Aronson and Rales. It shows how Aronson improperly
restricts board discretion in light of ubiquitous due care exculpation. Part
IV observes that this aspect of Aronson, in combination with Rales, should
lead rational boards to take a more passive role than they otherwise might
in managing corporations under certain relatively common circumstances.
By doing so, they would fall within the Rales line of cases and demand will
turn solely on the probability of directors’ personal liability in a derivative
suit. By taking a more active managerial role, they would be vulnerable
under Aronson even if the directors face no likelihood of personal liability.
9. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 (“[I]t should be noted that the business judgment rule
operates only in the context of director action. Technically speaking, it has no role where
directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed to
act.”).
10. Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993).
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Part V anticipates two objections—one solely to the overdelegation
argument and the other to both the overdelegation and board authority
arguments. First, it may be that recent Delaware case law regarding
directors’ duty of good faith makes board inaction less likely to be
exculpable under a 102(b)(7) charter provision. If so, boards would have
little incentive to overdelegate because the Rales test turns out poorly for
them if they face a substantial likelihood of personal liability for breach of
good faith. But this argument places far too much weight on the doctrine
of good faith and should give rational boards little reason to discount the
litigation-related advantages of delegation. Second, it may be that
whatever odd implications are created by Aronson at the demand stage,
they are of no real import because exculpation clauses can be enforced
through a contemporaneous motion to dismiss. This objection, however,
fails to take into account (1) the different evidentiary standards applicable
to motions to dismiss for failure to make demand and 12(b)(6) motions to
dismiss based on an exculpatory clause and (2) the characterization of an
exculpatory clause as an affirmative defense. Part VI observes that the
Aronson and Rales tests need to be harmonized and concludes that, despite
Rales’s potential for underestimating directors’ biases, the Aronson test
should be revised to reflect Rales’s more direct approach.
II.

THE DEMAND REQUIREMENT AND DEMAND FUTILITY

A.

Boards, Shareholders and Derivative Suits
1.

Board Authority

The Delaware General Corporate Law allocates authority over a
corporation’s everyday decision-making to the board of directors except as
otherwise provided by law or charter provisions. 11 The Aronson court
observed that Section 141(a) establishes “[a] cardinal precept of the [law] .
. . is that directors, rather than shareholders, manage the business and
affairs of the corporation.” 12 As a descriptive matter, it is certainly the case
that corporate law places control of the day-to-day operations of a
corporation in the hands of a board as opposed to the hands of
shareholders. 13
11. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 141(a).
12. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811.
13. Lynn Stout has noted that, in fact, a surprisingly small number of Delaware firms
opt out of director control as allowed by the last clause of § 141(a). See Lynn A. Stout, The
Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on Why Investors in Public
Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 669 (2003).
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The normative basis for directors’ authority is the matter of some
debate, 14 as are the circumstances in which that authority ought to be
transferred to or shared with other constituencies, particularly
shareholders. 15 There is consensus, however, that corporations realize
significant gains through the allocation of everyday decision-making
authority to a small group of actors. If authority were spread over a wide
group (say, public shareholders), significant collective action problems
would arise. Diffuse decision-makers are likely to be rationally apathetic
towards the decision-making process as they recognize that they have little
ability to affect the outcome and will only realize a fraction of the
consequences of any particular decision. 16 To the extent they do
participate, they would likely be poorly informed relative to insiders. 17
Moreover, the diffuse decision-makers might have significantly different
interests, some of which may conflict. 18 And, of course, corporate
decision-making by thousands of participants would be incredibly
unwieldy and slow. 19 On the other hand, if authority is vested in a small
body that is perceived as relatively neutral and consistent, it may encourage
other constituencies to make otherwise risky firm-specific investments. 20
All of this counsels for vesting day-to-day operating authority in a small,

14. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735 (2006) (arguing against Lucian Bebchuk’s
proposal for shareholder empowerment and for the preservation of the current regime of
limited shareholder voting rights); Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production
Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (opposing the dominant principalagent model of the public corporation driven by the goal of shareholder wealth
maximization).
15. Suffice it to say that the appropriate outer bounds of board authority vis-a-vis
shareholder authority are a topic about which a significant amount of academic and judicial
ink has been spilled. For a taste of the debate in regard to shareholder voting, see Lucian A.
Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 (2007) (hereinafter
Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise); Martin Lipton & William Savitt, The Many Myths of
Lucian Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 733 (2007); Jonathan R. Macey, Too Many Notes and Not
Enough Votes: Lucian Bebchuk and Emperor Joseph II Kvetch About Contested Director
Elections and Mozart's Seraglio, 93 VA. L. REV. 759 (2007); John F. Olson, Professor
Bebchuk's Brave New World: A Reply to "The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise", 93 VA.
L. REV. 773 (2007); Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefit of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L.
REV. 789 (2007); E. Norman Veasey, The Shareholder Franchise is Not a Myth: A
Response to Professor Bebchuk, 93 VA. L. REV. 811 (2007).
16. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 15, at 792.
17. See, e.g., id.
18. See, e.g., id., at 794-95. For more information, see Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate
Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting (N.Y.U.,
Stern Sch. of Bus., 2008), available at http://home.uchicago.edu/~aagrawa1/
AGRAWAL_paper.pdf (demonstrating that union shareholders are less likely to support
director nominees at corporations at which the union’s members are employed).
19. See, e.g., Stout, supra note 15, at 792.
20. Id. at 795-97.
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relatively well-informed and presumptively neutral group. 21
Corporate litigation decisions are subsumed within this day-to-day
operating authority. 22 As an example, assume that a counterparty to a
contract with Corporation X fails to provide services or deliver goods as
promised. Corporation X has the ability to go to court and enforce the
contract. Whether Corporation X will litigate, however, is up to the board
(or its delegate). After all, not all potential actions that a corporation may
institute are necessarily worth pursuing. The board may choose not to file
a suit because, for instance, the litigation costs are too high relative to the
amount in question or the litigation would threaten to distract management
from running the corporation.
2.

Derivative Suits

What can shareholders do if they believe the board’s litigation
decision reduces firm value—say by failing to pursue a valuable claim
against the counterparty? The classic response is that shareholders can vote
(for new directors), sell (their stock to other investors) or sue (directors for
breach of fiduciary duty). 23 Continuing the above example, the third option
is accomplished through a derivative suit whereby the shareholder sues on
behalf of the corporation contending (1) that the corporation ought to have
sued the director for a breach of fiduciary duty in making a bad decision,
and (2) because it failed to do so, the shareholder would like to step into the
corporation’s shoes and proceed with the litigation on the corporation’s
behalf. 24
21. Theoretically, this smaller group could be a unitary executive rather than a board.
But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decision-making in Corporate
Governance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2002) (noting the decision-making improvements gained
by having a small group of decision-makers). Note that this justification for board authority
explicitly avoids application to authority outside the scope of day-to-day operating
authority. Some commentators have argued that board authority is problematic in respect of
a certain class of “rules-of-the-game decisions.” See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting
Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784 (2006); Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case
for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833 (2005). Others have argued that
even in those cases, the advantages of board authority may outweigh any disadvantages.
See Bainbridge, supra note 14; Leo E. Strine, Jr., Toward a True Corporate Republic: A
Traditionalist’s Response to Bebchuk’s Solution for Improving Corporate America, 119
HARV. L. REV. 1759 (2006).
22. See, e.g., Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 772-73 (Del. 1990); Bradley T.
Ferrell, A Hybrid Approach: Integrating the Delaware and the ALI Approaches to
Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 248 (1999).
23. See, e.g., MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATION LAW 483 (1995);
Robert B. Thompson, Shareholders as Grown-Ups: Voting, Selling and Limits on the
Board’s Power to “Just Say No,” 67 U. CIN. L. REV 999, 1000-01 (1999) (introducing
shareholder power to respond to actions of directors).
24. See David A. Skeel, The Accidental Elegance of Aronson v. Lewis 3 (U of Penn,
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Derivative suits thus represent an important avenue by which
shareholders can minimize agency costs that arise in widely-held
corporations. In the earlier hypothetical, directors may obtain benefits by
not suing the counterparty, such as avoiding the hassle of being deposed,
avoiding a reputation as a litigious person, or even receiving a bribe.
Moreover, they may undervalue the recovery to be obtained by the
corporation because they are unlikely to receive much, if any, of the benefit
from the judgment. 25
Leaving the contract hypothetical aside, take perhaps the most obvious
example of the diverging interests of shareholders and managers—theft of
corporate property or cash by the managers. Shareholders cannot sue the
thief directors directly because the harm was incurred by the corporation
and not directly by the shareholders. Because the claim belongs to the
corporation, it must initiate the litigation. However, in this case, the
thieves have the authority to decide whether or not the company should
sue. 26 Because they will, at the very least, be forced to reimburse the
corporation, the directors cannot be expected to direct the corporation to
bring a lawsuit. Shareholders who want the corporation to pursue litigation
against the directors can attempt to force the corporation to do so through a
derivative suit.
Derivative suits, however, pose a problem for the initial allocation of
authority within the corporation. It is easy to see that the power to sue
derivatively could very well swallow up the litigation-related authority that
boards are granted under Section 141(a). 27 What if it is not certain either
that the theft occurred or that, assuming something improper did happen, a
lawsuit to recover the stolen money is in the firm’s best interests? For
Section 141(a) to be effective, then, boards need to be protected to a certain
degree from derivative suits. 28

Inst for Law & Econ, Research Paper No. 07-28, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1027010 (detailing the history of the derivative suit).
25. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Independent Directors and Stock Market Prices: The New
Corporate Governance Paradigm 23 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 301,
2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=928100 (discussing potential incentives for
outside directors to engage in good performance).
26. See, e.g., Bebchuk, Shareholder Franchise, supra note 15, at 679-82 (discussing
role of shareholders).
27. See Aronson, 473 A. 2d at 811 (“By its very nature the derivative action impinges
on the managerial freedom of directors.”).
28. But see John C. Coffee, Jr. & Donald E. Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative
Suit: An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261, 262
(1981) (explaining how courts have upheld directors’ ability to avoid derivative suits).
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The Demand Requirement

This protection is given effect, to a large extent, by the substantive
rules of fiduciary obligations. The business judgment rule 29 limits the
number of triable fiduciary claims. 30 In the breach-of-contract example,
the board chose not to sue the counterparty. The failure to sue will mean
that the corporation will not realize any damages or settlement from the
counterparty. If shareholders sue derivatively, the business judgment rule,
assuming it has not been rebutted, acts to protect the board even if a judge
or jury might ultimately agree with the shareholders as to the merits of the
decision not to litigate.
The business judgment rule might prevent many incursions by
shareholders into board decision-making via the derivative suit. However,
the business judgment rule functions as a device within litigation.
Necessarily, a board (and therefore a corporation) will incur costs to
convince a court that the business judgment rule ought to protect the
board’s Original Decision. Those costs were imposed because a single
shareholder decided to file a derivative suit. Put another way, from the
time at which the shareholder sues derivatively until the time at which the
suit is dismissed, Section 141(a)’s allocation of authority has been turned
on its head. The derivative suit, even if ultimately unsuccessful, is at least
for a fleeting (or not-so-fleeting) moment a threat to the board’s authority
over the litigation decision itself.
Moreover, to the extent that application of the business judgment rule
is uncertain, there are significant incentives for the board to settle all
litigation. 31 The vast majority of companies purchase policies insuring
both directors against liability risk and the companies themselves for
reimbursements paid to directors under indemnification agreements. 32
Given the limitations placed on director indemnification in adjudicated
suits, 33 directors face a small but existent probability of a large loss. For
29. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (establishing presumption that “in making a business
decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the
honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company”)
30. Id. (“The business judgment rule is an acknowledgment of the managerial
prerogatives of Delaware directors under Section 141(a).”).
31. See DOOLEY, supra note 23, at 304-05.
32. See Sean J. Griffith, Uncovering a Gatekeeper: Why the SEC Should Mandate
Disclosure of Details Concerning Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance Policies, 154
U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1168 (2006) (citations omitted) (noting a survey indicating that 99% of
U.S. company respondents had purchased D&O policies in 2004).
33. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §145(b) (2006) (requiring certification that the director
“acted in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably believed to be in or not opposed
to the best interests of the corporation” as well as an additional judicial determination, in the
event of liability, that the director “is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity” for
“proper” expenses).
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directors, then, the decision to settle even meritless suits is almost costless,
save for potentially increased insurance premia which will, in any event, be
passed on to the corporation.
The demand requirement is corporate law’s answer to these problems.
Under the Delaware Chancery Court rules, a shareholder must make a
demand on the board requesting that it cause the corporation to sue
whomever it is that the shareholder believes ought to be sued. 34 The
demand requirement, insofar as it gives the board the power to say “no” to
a derivative suit, preserves the original allocation of authority to the
board. 35
The demand requirement serves other salutary purposes as well. First,
the demand requirement promotes judicial efficiency by keeping fights
inside boardrooms and outside of courtrooms. 36 Alternative dispute
resolution has become extremely popular as a way to take some of the
pressure off of overburdened courts. 37 Delaware’s demand requirement
establishes a system of extrajudicial dispute resolution that may allow the
Chancery Court to devote more time to matters not otherwise susceptible to
alternative resolution. 38
Similar but distinct from its effect on the allocation of authority within
a firm, the demand requirement serves as a filter for frivolous suits. 39 As
noted above, there are significant incentives for directors to settle even
non-meritorious derivative suits. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are aware of these
incentives and are likely to file even non-meritorious suits. 40 The demand
requirement, to the extent it provides boards with an early crack at
dismissing the action or handing it over to the board, removes some of the
incentive for plaintiffs’ attorneys to bring frivolous cases.
The demand requirement serves its function well for as long as the
interests of the board in regard to the Demand Decision do not diverge

34. Subject to claims of demand futility or wrongful refusal discussed infra Part III.
See DEL. CT. C.P.R. 23.1. (specifying the statutory demand requirement).
35. See, e.g., Guttman, 823 A.2d at 500.
36. See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 255 (Del. 2000) (explaining how the demand
requirement can be used to avoid litigation).
37. See, e.g., Paul R. Verkuil, Privatizing Due Process, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 963, 983
(2005) (defining alternative dispute resolution as a source of private due process); Charles
Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 2073, 2104-05 (2002)
(explaining how alternative dispute resolution saves money).
38. See, e.g., Ferrell, supra note 22, at 248 and n. 26 (explaining the potential for intracorporate resolution as a rationale for the demand requirement).
39. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811-12.
40. See, e.g., Mark J. Loewenstein, Shareholder Derivative Litigation and Corporate
Governance, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 25-26 (1999) (showing how settlement incentives may
be exacerbated by the rules surrounding plaintiff’s attorney’s fees in derivative litigation);
Roberta Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON &
ORG. 55, 65 (1991) (same).
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from those of shareholders. Imagine that the “demanded” litigation has, as
a named defendant, a board member. In fact, most derivative suits are
attempts to force the corporation to sue an insider, not a counterparty to a
contract or a third party tortfeasor. 41 Can we trust directors to sue
themselves or other directors when appropriate? If we cannot, the demand
requirement may allocate too much authority to the board at the expense of
the enforcement of directors’ fiduciary duties. There can be such a thing as
too much protection of directorial prerogative—after all, even the business
judgment rule can be rebutted. Without a way around the demand
requirement in cases where directors are disabled from independently
making a Demand Decision, directors’ fiduciary duties would be rendered
unenforceable and directors may systematically engage in value-destroying
activity.
III. THE DEMAND FUTILITY TESTS: ARONSON AND RALES
Shareholders do have ways to get around the demand requirement.
First, they can proceed with a derivative suit without making a demand on
the board if demand would have otherwise been futile. 42 Second, if they
make demand and the board “wrongfully” refuses the demand,
shareholders can proceed with the lawsuit. 43 Demand futility, however, is
by far the most popular of these two routes for shareholder-plaintiffs. 44
Indeed, demand futility has been called “the critical issue in derivative
litigation.” 45

41. See Skeel, supra note 24, at 3.
42. There is some dispute as to whether a futility exception ought to exist or whether
issues of futility would be better off being raised in a wrongful refusal action. See Kamen v.
Kemper Finan. Servs., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1344 (7th Cir. 1990), rev’d 500 U.S. 90 (1991)
(adopting a universal demand requirement); Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate
Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461, 502-03 (1992) (criticizing universal demand); Jeffrey S.
Facter, Fashioning a Coherent Demand Rule for Derivative Litigation in California, 40
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 379, 379 (2000) (proposing that California adopt a universal demand
rule).
43. See, e.g., Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1217-19 (Del. 1996), overruled on
other grounds; Brehm, 746 A.2d 244.
44. The general consensus is that it is almost impossible for shareholder plaintiffs to
prevail in a “wrongful refusal” action. See, e.g., Randall S. Thomas & Kenneth J. Martin,
Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH U. L. Q. 569,
576-77 (2001); Thompson & Thomas, supra note 8, at 1782 (examining data showing that
in most cases demand is not made on the board of directors).
45. Stephen Bainbridge, The Demand Requirement in Derivative Litigation: Part II,
http://www.businessassociationsblog.com/lawandbusiness/comments/the_demand_requirem
ent_in_derivative_litigation_part_ii/ (emphasis added).
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Aronson

Perhaps surprisingly, the general test for demand futility in Delaware
has remained constant for over 20 years. 46 In Aronson, the Delaware
Supreme Court held that demand is futile when “under the particularized
facts alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors are
disinterested and independent, and (2) the challenged transaction was
otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.” 47 The two
prongs are intended to track the business judgment rule; in fact, the second
prong consists solely of a reference to the rule. 48 The Aronson court drove
the point home, noting that demand futility “is inextricably bound to issues
of business judgment and the standards of that doctrine’s applicability.” 49
Why should demand futility be inextricably bound with the business
judgment rule? The business judgment rule might be a logical jumping-off
point for evaluating a Demand Decision, just as it is the standard for
evaluating most board decisions. But the Aronson test—especially its
second prong—does not directly apply the business judgment rule (even
prospectively) to the Demand Decision. Instead, it focuses its analysis on
the Original Decision, the “challenged transaction.”
It is not clear why demand futility should have anything to do with the
Original Decision. Demand futility is necessarily a predictive statement
about the Demand Decision. Shareholder plaintiffs have to argue that it
would make no difference—it would be futile—to ask the board to make
the Demand Decision. It would make no difference because it is obvious,
for some reason or another, that the board will reject demand. Absent some
link between (1) the nature of the Original Decision and (2) our expectation
of how the board will make a Demand Decision, the Original Decision is
more or less beside the point for demand futility purposes.
The lack of a necessary nexus between the quality of the Original
Decision and the futility of demand assumes that the primary reason to
require demand is to protect board authority. As discussed above, the

46. See Joshua L. Vineyard, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same?
Twenty Years of Corporate Board Domination and the Aronson v. Lewis Standard, 72 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1067, 1068 (2004) (demonstrating the pervasive use of the Aronson standard).
47. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. For some period following the court’s decision in
Aronson there was doubt as to whether the two prongs of the Aronson test were to be
viewed in the conjunctive or the disjunctive. The debate was ended in favor of the latter.
See Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 206 (Del. 1991).
48. It is often noted that the second prong imports the business judgment rule into the
demand futility decision. But the questions of disinterestedness are themselves foundational
questions in any business judgment analysis. See, e.g., DOOLEY, supra note 42, at 471-77.
To the extent a director is interested in a challenged transaction, he or she will not receive
protection of the business judgment rule. Id.
49. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 (emphasis added).
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argument for board authority over litigation decisions begins with the
observation that whether a lawsuit is in the corporation’s best interests
turns on a number of factors in addition to the merits of the claim, such as
litigation costs (if the case is a close call requiring substantial litigation),
reputational harm, and the potential for management distraction. These are
extra-legal issues about which the courts may have little institutional
competence. 50 The business judgment rule is justified in large part by the
view that boards are better than courts at making business decisions like
these. Absent other considerations, boards should decide such matters and
shareholders are generally better off if particular shareholders cannot
initiate litigation without the board’s approval.
However, in addition to protecting board authority, the demand
requirement also serves to filter out strike suits. 51 That function necessarily
involves review of the Original Decision because the quality of the Original
Decision is crucial to determining whether or not the derivative suit is a
“strike” suit or a legitimate one. Thus, even if there were no reason to
believe that boards ought to have any authority to decide when derivative
suits ought to proceed, the potential for frivolous derivative suits poses a
Quite apart from any concerns about the
problem for firm value. 52
advantages of board authority, a prophylactic device might be needed to
separate the good derivative suits from the bad ones.
Considering the centrality of board authority to corporate governance
generally, how important of an argument for requiring demand is “demand
as strike suit filter”? One gets something of an answer by reading Vice
Chancellor Strine’s opinion in Guttman v. Huang:
If the legal rule was that demand was excused whenever, by mere
notice pleading, the plaintiffs could state a breach of fiduciary
duty claim against a majority of the board, the demand
requirement of the law would be weakened and the settlement
value of so-called “strike suits” would greatly increase, to the
perceived detriment of the best interests of stockholders as
investors. But, if the demand excusal test is too stringent, then
stockholders may suffer as a class because the deterrence effects
of meritorious derivative suits on faithless conduct may be too
weak. The second prong of Aronson therefore balances the
conflicting policy interests at stake by articulating a safety valve
that releases a suit for prosecution when the complaint meets a
heightened pleading standard of particularity, because in these
50. See Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981) (“[W]e recognize that
(t)he final substantive judgment whether a particular lawsuit should be maintained requires a
balance of many factors ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, employee
relations, fiscal as well as legal.”) (quotations omitted).
51. See Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d 341, 352 (Del. Ch. 2007) ; Brehm, 746 A.2d at 255.
52. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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circumstances the threat of liability to the directors required to
act on the demand is sufficiently substantial to cast a reasonable
doubt over their impartiality. 53
On the one hand, the demand requirement serves the distinct function
of strike suit filter. On the other hand, demand futility is about board
authority and the need to depart therefrom only when its benefits are
outweighed by a systematic inability to hold fiduciaries responsible for
breaches of their duties. Filtering for strike suits is one benefit of granting
a board significant discretion, but it is not the only one. For example, even
if a claim is meritorious, there may be other reasons to not pursue litigation.
Why do courts talk so much about strike suits? Because limiting them is
the largest, but not sole, benefit provided by the demand requirement’s
return of authority to the board.
The second prong’s implicit adoption of “demand as strike suit filter”
allows courts to avoid thorny problems raised by board authority over
derivative litigation. In this regard, there is a fairly uncontroversial starting
point: directors with financial interests in the outcome of Demand
Decisions (or who are beholden to people with such interests) should not be
trusted to make them in the best interests of the corporation. But what if
boards’ Demand Decisions are consistently problematic outside of this
admittedly limited set of cases? For instance, directors may simply be
embarrassed by their past conduct (or past omissions) and may seek to
quash a derivative suit to avoid the reputational harm a lawsuit might
cause. 54 Alternatively, bounded rationality and/or structural biases may
prevent even the least interested or embarrassed directors from judging
demand fairly by making it difficult if not impossible for directors to either
come to grips with the harm they have caused the corporation or take action
to rectify the situation. 55
If true—and it has at least some anecdotal support considering the
paucity of demand acceptances—this view would lead to the conclusion
that demand is, in fact, almost always futile. Adopting such a position—
call it something like the “strong bias” view—should probably lead to the
rechristening of whatever test is adopted. The operative question would
not be whether demand is futile because it would always be futile. Rather,
any preliminary test would simply enable a court to weed out frivolous
suits.
The problems created by taking this position are thorny because there
are, of course, costs in asking only whether a complaint satisfies some
53. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 500 (Del. Ch. 2003) (emphasis added).
54. It is not clear what marginal reputational harm is caused by allowing a suit to
proceed once a complaint (no matter how “blocked” it may ultimately be by the demand
requirement or an exculpation clause) is filed and presumably made public.
55. See e.g., Guttman, 823 A.2d at 500.
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minimum threshold of viability. Cutting boards out of the action means
that they can no longer evaluate the extra-legal considerations concerning a
derivative suit’s value to a corporation. A test that assumes all demand is
futile and serves solely as a filter for strike-suits would then likely fail to
stop suits that—while potentially meritorious—are not in the shareholders’
best interests, all things considered. Courts could be required to take the
extra-legal considerations into account—think of a Zapata-style analysis
for all derivative suits—but we cannot be sure that courts will do a great
job of evaluating such considerations. 56
Moreover, the strong bias view is a fairly blunt instrument. The
problem with embarrassment or bounded rationality or structural bias,
unlike financial interest, is that it is hard to prove. To create a workable
framework, corporate law will likely have to assume either (1) these states
of mind always exist for all boards or (2) never exist for any board. While
admittedly a not-uncontroversial description of the way boards actually
operate, the latter assumption seems at least to comport with Delaware
jurisprudence’s most basic foundation. 57
Unless one adopts the strong bias view, the demand requirement must
be premised primarily on the need to protect board authority. The Aronson
opinion itself supports this approach. For instance the Supreme Court
stated that demand futility is intended to capture the instances in which a
board “is under an influence which sterilizes [its] discretion [as to whether
to proceed with the suit in question].” 58 If that is to be the question, any
test for demand futility needs to focus primarily on the putative Demand
Decision, not the Original Decision.
But then why do Aronson’s prongs turn on the quality of the Original
Decision? The Original Decision may be important in balancing board
authority with enforcement of fiduciary duties. 59 Directors who were
financially interested in the Original Decision will likely be financially
interested in the Demand Decision. Those dominated by parties who were
interested in the Original Decision are likely to be similarly dominated by
those who are interested in the Demand Decision. Thus, the first Aronson
prong, which can look backwards to the Original Decision, serves as a
sensible proxy for determining whether the board is capable of being
disinterested and independent in making a Demand Decision.
56. But see Hill & McDonnell supra note 8, at 855 (suggesting that courts evaluate the
level of structural bias present in board decision-making). For criticism of Zapata on this
point, see e.g., Julian Velasco, Structural Bias and the Need for Substantive Review, 82
WASH. U. L. Q. 821, 850 (2004) and accompanying footnotes.
57. See infra note 86 and accompanying text (describing post-Rales cases establishing
that an exculpation clause removes any concern as to a director’s ability to make an
independent demand decision).
58. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.
59. See Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 230 (Del. Ch. 1990).
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Likewise, the second Aronson prong, which looks strictly backwards
to the Original Decision, serves as a proxy of sorts. As mentioned earlier,
to the extent that the Original Decision was not the subject of a valid
business judgment, the business judgment rule would not apply in a
derivative suit and directors could potentially be personally liable for
damages. In such cases we ought to be skeptical of directors’ ability to rise
above their financial interest in not being sued. 60 The second Aronson
prong thus stands in as a substitute for a certain kind of director interest at
the demand stage. 61
The following illustrates the ways in which the Original Decision and
the Demand Decision are distinct bases for judging demand futility. The
first Aronson prong involves questions of director disinterest and
independence. Take the following example: Company X has a sevenmember board of directors. Company Y serves as a supplier for Company
X. Six months earlier, Company X’s board met to discuss a new agreement
with Company Y. Company X’s directors voted to enter into an agreement
with Company Y under which Company Y would deliver supplies to
Company X at a price significantly higher than the market rate for such
supplies. Now imagine that shareholders discover that the seven Company
X directors were the sole shareholders of Company Y. If Company X
shareholders demand that Company X sue the directors for breaching their
duty of loyalty, demand will be excused under the first Aronson prong. 62
Note that the analysis is focused on the Original Decision rather than the
Demand Decision.
What if only three of Company X’s directors had been the sole
shareholders of Company Y, but one of those three was the CEO of
Company X. Assume further that two of the other four directors of
Company X were employees of Company X subject to being fired by the
CEO/director. In that case there may be a reasonable doubt that, with
respect to the decision to award Company Y the contract, the three
directors were disinterested and the other two were independent. 63
60. One might sensibly ask whether there is even a cognizable interest in that case,
given directors’ insurance.
61. It is perhaps worth also noting that the second prong may be superfluous. If the
first Aronson prong (disinterestedness and independence) was read broadly to look both
back to the Original Decision as well as prospectively to the Demand Decision, it could
easily capture this fear-of-liability point.
62. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815 (“Certainly, if this is an ‘interested’ director
transaction, such that the business judgment rule is inapplicable to the board majority
approving the transaction, then the inquiry ceases.”); see also Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d
619, 624 (Del. 1984), overruled on other grounds; Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del.
2000).
63. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816 (“Independence means that a director’s decision is
based on the corporate merits of the subject before the board rather than extraneous
considerations or influences. . . . [However, W]e conclude that in the demand-futile context

718

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:3

Demand would be excused. Again, disinterest and independence are
measured by reference to the Original Decision.
This need not be the case, however. Taking the hypothetical further,
what if the three Company X directors were interested in the contract at the
time of the Original Decision but none of the other four directors were
employees of Company X? 64 Absent any other facts, a majority of the
board was disinterested and independent in regard to the Original Decision.
Assume that, sometime after the Original Decision, one or more of the noninterested, independent directors became employees of Company X,
subject to control by the interested CEO/director. Now, such an
employee/director would likely not be independent with respect to the
Demand Decision. In such cases, demand would surely be futile under the
first prong of Aronson, notwithstanding the fact that there was no
reasonable doubt that the majority of directors, when making the Original
Decision, was disinterested or independent. 65 Thus, the first Aronson
prong seems to be applicable to either the Original Decision or the Demand
Decision.
The second Aronson prong, on the other hand, is very clearly limited
to review of the Original Decision. 66 Continuing the hypothetical from
above, assume three interested Company X directors and four disinterested
and independent directors both at the time of the Original Decision and at
the time of the Demand Decision. Assume further, however, that either (a)
a plaintiff charging domination and control of one or more directors must allege
particularized facts manifesting ‘a direction of corporate conduct in such a way as to
comport with the wishes or interests of the corporation (or persons) doing the controlling.’”)
64. Assume that the approval of the contract with Company Y was not approved by
disinterested directors pursuant to DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §141(a)(1) because, for instance,
three of the four disinterested directors rejected the deal.
65. See, e.g., Rales, 634 A.2d at 936 (“To establish lack of independence, [plaintiff]
must show that the directors are ‘beholden’ to the [interested defendants] or so under their
influence that their discretion would be sterilized.”).
66. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814 (“Hence, the Court of Chancery must [inquire] . . .
into the substantive nature of the challenged transaction and the board’s approval thereof.”)
(emphasis added). Conceptually, one could imagine that the second Aronson prong applied
to the Demand Decision is roughly the wrongful refusal analysis. The “wrongfulness” of
the refusal is determined via application of the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Grimes v.
Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1218-19 (Del. 1996). Accordingly, the shareholder claiming
wrongful refusal must “allege facts with particularity creating a reasonable doubt that the
board. . . acted independently or with due care in responding to the demand.” Id. at 1219.
Other iterations of the wrongful refusal standard require allegations that “directors [did not
act] in an informed manner [or] with due care [or] in a good faith belief that their action was
in the best interest of the corporation.” Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 198 (Del. 1991).
Any potential conflict between the two standards was apparently resolved in Scattered Corp.
v. Chicago Stock Exchange, Inc., 701 A.2d 70 (Del. 1997). There, the Delaware Supreme
Court held that “[f]ailure of an otherwise independent-appearing board or committee to act
independently is a failure to carry out its fiduciary duties in good faith or to conduct a
reasonable investigation.” 701 A.2d at 75.
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the disinterested directors who voted in favor of the deal with Company Y
failed to consider all reasonably available material information, 67 or (b) the
transaction with Company Y was so egregiously one-sided as to be
irrational or waste. 68 Aronson’s second prong is satisfied by looking at the
procedural and perhaps substantive quality of the Original Decision. 69 In
this case, demand would be futile because the Original Decision would not
be entitled to the presumption of the business judgment rule. Expectations
about the procedure and/or substance of the board’s putative Demand
Decision are excluded.
Aronson’s second prong makes sense as a proxy for a certain kind of
director interest—fear of personal liability. And a helpful proxy it is, as
long as directors are potentially liable for Original Decisions that were not
the subject of a valid business judgment. That was true at the time Aronson
was decided but is not necessarily so since the Delaware legislature
permitted companies to include exculpation provisions in their certificates
of incorporation. 70 Section 102(b)(7) permits companies to exculpate
directors from derivative suit liability, at least to the extent they do not
violate their duty of loyalty or fail to act in good faith. 71 Accordingly, the
statute is generally interpreted as providing protection to directors for
breaches of their duty of care. 72
If directors are protected from liability for breaches of the duty of
care, it will be difficult to prove that their discretion would be “sterilized”
when making a Demand Decision. 73 Without the specter of personal
67. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (holding that the
determination of whether business judgment of board of directors is informed turns on
whether directors have informed themselves, prior to making business decision, of all
material information reasonably available to them).
68. See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 266 (stating that alleging waste requires pleading
“particular facts tending to show that no reasonable business person would have made the
[same] decision . . . under these circumstances”).
69. Delaware courts have expressly rejected “substantive due care.” See, e.g., Brehm,
746 A.2d at 264. However, there is arguably a practical outer boundary, the crossing of
which resembles something akin to breaching substantive due care. See David Rosenberg,
Galactic Stupidity and the Business Judgment Rule, 32 J. CORP. L. 301, 321-22 (2007).
70. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7).
71. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7)(i) and (ii). Exculpation is also not available
for intentional misconduct, knowing violations of the law, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 174
violations (unlawful dividend payments, stock purchases or redemptions), or transactions
through which directors receive improper personal benefits. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 §
102(b)(7)(ii)-(iv).
72. See, e.g., John L. Reed & Matt Neiderman, “Good Faith” and the Ability of
Directors to Assert § 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to
Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of Fiduciary Duty, 29
DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 114 (2004) (citing treatises to that effect).
73. As discussed earlier, potential personal liability may not be the only basis on which
directors might systematically make poor Demand Decisions. See supra notes 54 and
accompanying text. See also Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 500 (Del. 2003).
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liability hanging over their head, what else could a shareholder likely prove
that would lead a court to believe that the directors could not make an
independent Demand Decision? Yet Aronson’s second prong offers
plaintiffs a non-rebuttable presumption that demand is futile anyway. 74
The existence of exculpation clauses, then, may cause the second
prong to be a less-than-perfect proxy for director interest in the Demand
Decision. There are a set of cases namely duty of care cases—where the
connection between (1) the lack of a valid business judgment regarding the
Original Decision and (2) directors’ inability to judge a demand fairly may
simply not exist.
As a consequence, boards are prevented from
determining, for instance, that prudential considerations may counsel in
favor of rejecting demand. 75 In those cases, Aronson fails to properly
balance board authority against enforcement of fiduciary duties.
B.

Rales

Non-action may provide the basis for personal liability if a director’s
failure to act violates his or her duty of oversight. 76 Non-action, in this
sense, does not include the case in which a board considers taking a
particular action and decides that continuing with the status quo is the best
course of action. The decision to not act is itself considered a board
action. 77 Rather, board non-action covers instances in which decisions are
never the subject of deliberations by a majority of the board and are
therefore not acted upon by that majority.
Historically, the duty of oversight was subsumed within the duty of

74. See Donald J. Wolfe & Michael A. Pittenger, Corporate and Commercial Practice
in the Delaware Court of Chancery § 9.02 (b)(3)(iii) n. 310-312 (“Aronson’s second prong
does not focus exclusively on the potential risk of liability of defendants arising from the
underlying transaction [sic] but upon whether that transaction is one that would be entitled
to the presumptions of valid business judgment. Whether the directors would or would not
be exculpated from personal liability by such a charter provision would seem to have
nothing to do with whether the decision itself was reached honestly and in good faith and
the existence of such a provision therefore is likely to be viewed as irrelevant to Aronson’s
second prong.”) (internal citations omitted). Recently, the opinion in In re Lear Corp.
S’holders Litig., 2008 WL 4053221, *6-7 (Del. Ch. 2008) seems to have analyzed
Aronson’s second prong by including considerations of the applicability of an exculpation
clause. Vice Chancellor Strine’s move in In re Lear is discussed at infra note 210.
75. Even in the context of special litigation committee decisions which receive
significantly less deference from Delaware courts than most board decisions, courts are to
consider such prudential matters. See Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 789 (Del. 1981).
76. See, e.g., Hillary A. Sale, Monitoring Caremark’s Good Faith, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L.
719 (2007) (describing a fairly robust duty).
77. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 (“[A] conscious decision to refrain from acting may
nonetheless be a valid exercise of business judgment and enjoy the protections of the
[business judgment] rule.”).
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care. 78 More recently, the Delaware Supreme Court has held that a claim
that directors consciously disregarded known duties violates the duty of
good faith, which itself sounds in the duty of loyalty. 79 Whatever the
nature of the claim, directors who did not take part in corporate decisions
but consciously disregarded their duties may face liability.
The potential for a duty-of-oversight derivative suit again poses a
problem for balancing board authority with the need to enforce fiduciary
duties. And again, the demand requirement cum futility exception is
designed to provide the solution. But Aronson and its second prong cannot
do any work when a derivative suit is based on the board’s failure to act. 80
As discussed earlier, Aronson first asked whether the board can be trusted
to make an unbiased Demand Decision. It then applied a once-removed
test based on the applicability of the business judgment rule to the Original
Decision. In cases of board non-action, however, the second Aronson
prong will always fail because there can have been no valid business
judgment regarding the board action when there was no board action.
Because Aronson’s second prong cannot be an effective test for
demand futility when the board does not act, the Delaware Supreme Court
had to develop a new one. In doing so, the court simply returned to the
fundamental question the Aronson prongs were originally intended to
represent—are these directors too biased to make an independent Demand
Decision? 81
After Rales, Delaware courts do not apply Aronson’s two prongs when
the basis for the derivative suit involves (1) a business decision made by a
board, a majority of whose members have been replaced, (2) a non-decision
by the board or (3) a decision made by the board of another company. 82 In
such cases, the question of demand futility turns on the generalized
question of “whether [there is] a reasonable doubt that . . . the board of
directors could have properly exercised its independent and disinterested

78. See, e.g., In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 960 (Del. Ch. 1996);
Stephen M. Bainbridge, et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA L.
REV. 559, 595-97 (2008).
79. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 370 (Del. 2006). For a discussion of the relative
merits of characterizing a duty-to-monitor claim as a duty of care or duty of loyalty claim,
see Bainbridge et al., supra note 78. See also Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Stone v.
Ritter and the Expanding Duty of Loyalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1769 (2007) (arguing that
good faith claims fit along a broader continuum of fiduciary duty cases).
80. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 813 (“Technically speaking [the business judgment rule]
has no role where directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious
decision, failed to act.”).
81. See Rales, 634 A.2d at 934 (“[I]t is appropriate . . . to examine whether the board
that would be addressing the demand can impartially consider its merits without being
influenced by improper considerations.”).
82. Id.
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business judgment in responding to a demand.” 83 This is essentially the
first principle behind Aronson, but without the two-pronged test. 84
The test established by Rales turns on whether the basis for the
complaint “renders any of the directors ‘interested’ and, if so, whether any
of the other directors are compromised in their ability to act independently
Assuming disinterestedness and
of the interested directors.” 85
independence regarding the Original Decision, demand futility under Rales
boils down to whether directors face a substantial likelihood of personal
liability. 86 As in the case of board action, this likelihood of personal
liability can be significantly affected by the presence of an exculpatory
clause. 87 If an exculpatory clause exists in the corporation’s charter, there
can only be a substantial likelihood of directors’ personal liability to the
extent the suit involves a non-exculpated claim. 88 Accordingly, duty of
care claims will not be sufficient to cast the specter of potential liability. 89
Instead, shareholders would have to allege non-exculpable claims—
breaches of the duty of loyalty or good faith. 90
Rales, by reverting back to the principle underlying Aronson, likely
does its balancing job more simply and clearly than Aronson. Along this
line, Chancellor Lamb has noted:
It has been observed that [Rales’s] simple and straightforward
inquiry would seem to be the very issue that Aronson, in its more
mechanical and roundabout way, was intended to resolve.
Moreover, because this formulation is one of general application
(and can as easily be applied in the business judgment rule
context addressed in Aronson), it is arguable that the current state
of the law is conceptually inverted and that it would be both
simpler and more direct to regard the original Aronson analysis
as a subpart of the more generally applicable and flexible

83. Id.
84. See Guttman, 823 A.2d at 500 (describing the similarities between the two tests).
85. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 928 (Del. Ch. 2007).
86. See Rales, 634 A.2d at 936 (“In such circumstances, a director cannot be expected
to exercise his or her independent business judgment without being influenced by the
adverse personal consequences resulting from the decision.”). Again, it may be that demand
should be considered futile in cases beyond those in which a substantial threat of liability (in
addition to self-interest and non-independence) is present. See supra notes 54 and
accompanying text. Nevertheless, it appears that, at least in the Rales line of cases, that is
not an open issue at this point.
87. See, e.g., In re Baxter Int’l, Inc. S’holders Litig., 654 A.2d 1268, 1269-70 (Del. Ch.
1995) (noting the firm’s certificate of incorporation had precluded the imposition of liability
on the directors).
88. See id. at 1270 (explaining that the pleadings must include non-exculpated
conduct).
89. Id.
90. Id.
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principle set forth in Rales. 91
Because it establishes a principle and is less specific than Aronson’s
prongs, the Rales test can adapt to the introduction of exculpatory clauses
and therefore does a better job of protecting board authority over litigation
decisions.
As a final point on board authority, consider the strong bias view
discussed earlier. On this view, almost no board can be expected to judge a
shareholder demand fairly and, therefore, any demand is futile. Aronson’s
second prong may make sense if the strong bias view prevails. Even if the
strong bias view is not attractive, it may be that boards are generally
incapable of fairly judging demand in respect of certain kinds of derivative
suits. This is, after all, the notion behind Aronson’s first prong and its
concern for board independence and disinterest. In between these two
views of board bias, one expansive and one rather limited, a third may
explain the differences between Aronson and Rales as they relate to board
authority. Rales and Aronson can be reconciled if boards are less likely to
judge demand fairly when the derivative claim relates to past board action
(keeping in mind that the board is exculpated from such claims in the
relevant situation) than they are when the claim relates to something the
board never did. Perhaps varying degrees of director embarrassment or a
greater inability to come to terms with mistakes actively made could justify
Aronson’s second prong.
Suffice it to say that this rationalization of Aronson’s second prong
has received little attention to this point. It may very well be that their sins
of commission are more troubling to directors than their sins of omission.
However, as discussed below in Part IV.C, passive directors have come
under increased criticism in corporate governance circles. Thus, if there is
a different psychological aspect to Rales versus Aronson cases, it is
certainly less pronounced than before.
IV. DEMAND FUTILITY AND OVERDELEGATION
While the Aronson test may be “conceptually inverted” 92 and may fail
to appropriately protect board authority in certain cases, when juxtaposed
with the Rales standard it also gives boards a reason to delegate more
decisions to subordinates than it might otherwise. If Rales is a more
director-friendly standard, then removing the board from corporate
decisions will assure the most advantageous litigation posture for directors.

91. Kohls v. Duthie, 791 A.2d 772, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 2000) (internal quotations
omitted).
92. Kohls, 791 A.2d at 781.
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Overdelegation

Imagine a director of Company A. She likely has another full-time
position, 93 and may even serve on other corporate boards. 94 She and her
fellow directors do not have the time to make or consider every decision
that Company A needs to make. Collectively, they probably do not even
have the time to make or consider every material decision that must be
made. To a large extent, they must delegate some decision-making
authority to management. 95
Nevertheless, whether out of a sense of duty, fear of personal liability
for breaches of fiduciary duties, or fear of reputational damage (or some
combination of all three), she would like to be involved in the decisionmaking process. Recent regulations push her in this direction by requiring
a certain amount of her involvement in Company A’s operations. 96 This
active participation can involve (1) direct decision-making or (2)
monitoring delegates. 97 Delegation with monitoring may itself mean
delegation to management with the board monitoring management’s
performance or delegation to a committee of directors which may or may
not further delegate to (and thereafter monitor) management. 98
Where does she draw the line as to which classes of decisions require
direct board action and which classes should be delegated? Potential
liability will certainly play a role in this calculus. At the motion to dismiss
stage and thereafter, directors are protected by the business judgment rule
for decisions made in their managerial capacity. But, if litigation proceeds
to that point, there are significant incentives for the board to settle even if
93. See, e.g., Elizabeth Nowicki, Not in Good Faith, 60 SMU L. REV. 441, 482-84
(2007) (“Typical directors of Fortune 500 companies are usually either current officers of
large businesses or former officers who are currently holding other board of consulting
positions.”).
94. See, e.g., Abigail Aims, 2005 Trends in Corporate Governance Practices of the 100
Largest U.S. Public Companies, 1523 PRAC. L. INST. CORP. 223, 247 (2006) (charting the
number of directors of the Top 100 companies who serve on other boards).
95. See, e.g., DOOLEY supra note 23, at 182-83 (explaining that management and
policymaking are truly executive functions).
96. See, e.g., NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.03 (2004) and NASD Rule
4350(c)(2) (2006) (requiring independent directors to meet in regular sessions without
inside directors); NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.05 (2004) and NASD Rule
4350(c)(3)(A), 4350(c)(4)(A) (2006) (requiring board action in respect to compensation
decisions); 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m), NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A.07(a)
(2004) and NASD Rule 4350(d) (2006) (requiring action by members of the board’s audit
committee).
97. See Jill Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 268-75 (1997)
(describing the distinction between a “monitoring” board and a “managerial” board).
98. For a committee decision to qualify as a board “non-decision” and therefore qualify
for Rales treatment, the committee must consist of less than half of the members of the
board at the time demand would otherwise be required. See Ryan, 918 A.2d at 353.
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the derivative suit has little chance for ultimate success. 99 Also, if the
litigation proceeds past the motion to dismiss stage, the corporation is
likely to incur significant legal costs aside from settlement costs.
As discussed above, directors are further insulated from litigation risk
by the demand requirement. This should provide our director with a
significant level of comfort, as long as she can be reasonably sure that
demand will not be deemed futile. In addition to the significant timing
advantages offered by the demand requirement, it may offer other
procedural advantages (discussed in Part V.B below) for her attempts to
stymie any derivative suit. Consequently, when deciding how to act as a
board it should be of no small importance that demand be required, i.e. not
futile, should a derivative suit challenging the corporate action (or inaction)
be filed.
Under Rales, the relevant question for demand purposes will be
whether or not there is a reasonable doubt that a majority of the board
could properly exercise its independent and disinterested business
judgment in responding to demand. 100 Crucially, in the case of a board
delegating corporate decisions about which the directors have no personal
interest and are otherwise independent-minded, the key to that question will
be whether the corporation has an exculpatory clause and, if so, whether
the claimed breach is exculpable. 101 If the alleged breach is covered by an
exculpatory clause, demand will be required because Delaware courts
recognize no cognizable interest disabling the directors from making the
Demand Decision.
Contrast that result with the situation had the directors not delegated
and instead made a full (or at least majority) board decision regarding the
matters. Because there had been board action, demand would be judged
under Aronson. In the case of a decision about which the directors have no
personal interest and are otherwise independent-minded and where the
company has an exculpatory clause that covers any claim, demand will still
be potentially futile under Aronson’s second prong if plaintiffs successfully
plead a due care breach. Sufficiently pleading a duty of care claim with
particularity is difficult, but not nearly impossible. Thus, if boards rely on
the demand requirement to protect them from derivative litigation,
delegation will be preferable to direct management in these circumstances.
One important limitation on these incentives could be the capacity of
directors to otherwise effectively mitigate litigation risk. The analysis
99. See supra notes 23 and accompanying text.
100. Rales, 634 A.2d at 934.
101. See supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text; Desimone, 924 A.2d at 935-36.
Regarding exculpability, delegation may present the question of whether Caremark duties,
and therefore the duty of good faith, have been violated. See infra Part V.A (discussing the
Caremark duties in the case of delegation).
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above assumes that majority board involvement cannot be expected to
significantly reduce the number of decisions about which shareholders will
colorably complain in duty of care derivative suits. If this were not the
case—that is, if boards could by their very involvement in decisionmaking, greatly reduce duty of care litigation—boards, despite recognizing
the demand-related advantages provided by Rales, might still expect the
benefits of full board activity to outweigh those advantages. An ounce of
prevention is worth a pound of cure, particularly considering the nonlitigation costs (e.g., reputation costs) that can be incurred when decisions
turn out poorly. At the very least, directors might feel confident enough in
the merits of the case to avoid incurring settlement costs and might expect
to be able to cut litigation off before other significant costs are incurred.
But what level of comfort can directors reach regarding the risk of
prospective duty of care litigation? Will there be colorable duty of care
claims despite their direct participation? The answer is almost certainly
yes, keeping in mind that directors do not ask themselves whether they can
prevent ultimately meritorious litigation by actively participating in
corporate decision-making. The relevant issue instead, is the level of costs
associated with all potential litigation (including distraction, settlement
costs, and litigation fees), and whether they can be minimized or avoided
by active director participation in the original decision-making process.
Directors’ most significant protection from potential duty of care
litigation is the combination of the pleading requirements of Chancery Rule
23.1 and the business judgment rule. Under Rule 23.1’s pleading
requirements, plaintiffs must plead particular facts that show demand
would be futile. 102 This is generally understood to be a significant
procedural burden. 103 All the while, these heightened pleading standards
exist against the backdrop of the business judgment rule. In this regard,
some scholars characterize the current standard for due care liability as
requiring “little more of a director than a ritualistic consideration of
relevant data.” 104 On the other hand, others believe that a certain level of
102. See DEL. CT. C.P.R. 23.1 (requiring the plaintiff to allege “reasons for the plaintiff’s
failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort.”); Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254 (“What
the pleader must set forth are particularized factual statements that are essential to the
claim.”) (citations omitted).
103. DEL. CT. C.P.R. 23.1. But see Brehm, 746 A.2d at 268 (Hartnett, J. concurring)
(“The reason for Rule 23.1 is judicial economy. It is not intended to preclude a judicial
inquiry where the pleaded facts, if true, and any inferences that may be drawn from them . . .
show the likelihood of misconduct by the directors.”). For a more detailed discussion of the
relative burdens created by Rule 23.1 and notice pleading under Rule 8(a), see Part V.B
infra.
104. Stephen J. Lubben & Alana Darnell, Delaware’s Duty of Care, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L.
589, 591 (2006); see also Brehm, 746 A.2d at 264 (“Due care in the decision-making
context is process due care only.”); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (“Disney IV”),
907 A.2d 693, 749-50 (Del. Ch. 2005) (“[C]ompliance with a director’s duty of care can
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substantive egregiousness will suffice to result in a violation of fiduciary
duties. 105
The fuzziness of the scope of the duty of care is but one example of
the indeterminacy of Delaware corporate law. 106 But even if directors
knew for certain that due care required, for example, only the “ritualistic
consideration of relevant data,” what are the contours of the ritual, and
what data is relevant? As Ehud Kamar has observed:
[C]orporate law is not an exact science. Rather, it is a set of
loosely defined guidelines made concrete by courts after the fact.
The messages the guidelines carry, in general, is that corporate
fiduciaries simply must do their utmost to promote shareholder
interests. Exactly what this means in practice is not clear.
Although court decisions list relevant criteria for judging
managerial behavior, these criteria are not exhaustive. Indeed,
courts often emphasize their incompleteness, leaving the legal
community wondering what additional criteria may prove
relevant in the future. 107
Delaware courts’ decisions (including duty of care decisions) are
extremely fact-sensitive. 108 Despite the best of intentions, they are likely
subject to considerable hindsight bias. 109 Accordingly, it is exceedingly
difficult to be sure that colorable litigation will not crop up prior to
deciding whether to take an active role in making corporate decisions. 110
Prudent directors, therefore, need not assume that board diligence
would necessarily insulate them from duty of care claims, even with the
protection of the business judgment rule. In the face of even a slightly
indeterminate litigation risk and the magnitude of liability risk relative to

never appropriately be judicially determined by reference to the content of the board
decision that leads to a corporate loss, apart from consideration of good faith or rationality
of the process employed.”) (quoting Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967).
105. See Rosenberg, supra note 69, at 320.
106. See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1 (2005) (describing the way in which the
Delaware courts’ interpretation of “good faith” shifts over time in response to, inter alia,
political pressures).
107. Ehud Kamar, Shareholder Litigation Under Indeterminate Corporate Law, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 887, 891 (1999).
108. See, e.g., Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in
Corporate Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1915 (1998) (describing Delaware decisions as
involving “loosely defined legal tests whose precise meaning depends on the particular facts
of each case.”).
109. See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 547 (8th ed. 2000) (explaining the hindsight bias).
110. To these questions of indeterminacy, one should add the directors’ recognition
(from a combination of modesty and awareness of time demands) that they might make
procedural mistakes.
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their personal net worth, directors are likely to be cautious. 111 Similarly,
excessive directorial caution may stem from recognition of the costs
imposed on the firm through litigation, even if such litigation does not
result in success for plaintiffs. One would expect the differences between
the demand futility tests in Aronson and Rales to allow directors a device
for mitigating some of this risk—the relative advantage of delegation and
monitoring vis-à-vis direct board decision-making.
B.

Overdelegation at Work

Although there are multiple decision classes for which such delegation
may make sense, executive compensation may be a particularly good
example. First, delegation of certain compensation matters to board
compensation committees is required or encouraged by the stock exchanges
already. The New York Stock Exchange requires its listed companies to
establish compensation committees comprised of independent directors and
charge them with, at a minimum, reviewing and approving CEO goals and
objectives relevant to his or her compensation, evaluating his or her
performance in light thereof and, “either as a committee or together with
the other independent directors (as directed by the board), determin[ing]
and approv[ing] the CEO's compensation level based on this evaluation.” 112
For non-CEO compensation, incentive-compensation and equity plan
decisions, however, the compensation committee needs only “make
recommendations” to the board. 113 Boards, of course, are free to require
that a compensation committee do more than merely “recommend.”
Nasdaq companies, on the other hand, do not need to have compensation
committees, but must either have a compensation committee comprised of
independent directors or involve a majority of independent directors in
compensation decisions. 114 Moreover, whatever form the decision-making
body takes, its role need only be advisory. 115 Again, however, a board is
free to require that a committee take on more responsibility.
Although not required, delegation by boards is advantageous given the
tests of Aronson and Rales.
The independence of compensation
gatekeepers means that management compensation (as distinct from board
111. See Kamar, supra note 107, at 895-96. One way corporate law mitigates this
potentially excessive caution is through director indemnification and insurance.
112. NYSE, Inc., Listed Company Manual § 303A(5) (2004).
113. Id. Compensation committees must also produce the compensation report that is to
be included in the corporation’s proxy statement.
114. NASDAQ, Manual, Rule 5605(d)(2009).
115. See id. (requiring the decision-maker to determine or recommend compensation to
the board for determination). With respect to CEO compensation, a committee may make
recommendations to the full board which may then decide the CEO’s compensation, as long
as the CEO takes no part in the deliberations. Id.
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compensation) is not likely to pose serious duty of loyalty issues. 116 Thus,
the majority of derivative suits in the executive compensation context
generally fall into three categories. When a majority of the board acts,
shareholders bring due care or waste claims against the board. 117 When the
board delegates to a committee, shareholders bring care or waste claims
against committee members and, perhaps, oversight claims against the
board.
When the board or committee delegates to management,
shareholders bring oversight claims against the delegating body and,
perhaps, duty of loyalty claims against management. 118 In the first type,
claims against the board for board action, demand futility is evaluated
under Aronson. In the second and third types, claims against the committee
based on its decision or against the board or committee based on its failure
to monitor demand futility is evaluated under Rales. 119
Consider the Chancery Court’s recent decision in Desimone v.
Barrows. Shareholders of Sycamore Networks brought a derivative suit
alleging, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty by the board relating to the
backdating of stock options awarded to employees and directors. 120 The
116. See Thomas & Martin, supra note 44, at 577-78 (“[Showing of financial interest]
requires facts that would support . . . a taint of conflict of interest, facts that are more likely
to be present in closely held companies than in public corporations. Many public
corporations have compensation committees comprised mostly, if not exclusively, of
disinterested outside directors.”). As noted earlier, new exchange rules now require that
publicly traded corporations have compensation committees comprised exclusively of
disinterested directors.
117. See id. at 581 (examining the difficulties for shareholders when bringing breach of
duty of care and waste claims in executive compensation suits). Recently, these complaints
have also raised good faith claims. See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.
(“Disney V”), 906 A.2d 27, 46 (Del. 2006) (explaining that the duties to use due care and to
act in good faith are distinct); see also infra Part V.A (extensively discussing good faith).
118. See, e.g., Desimone, 924 A.2d at 933. In addition to suing a delegating
compensation committee, shareholders may allege breach of oversight duties against, for
example, an audit committee for not recognizing potential backdating risks. Id. at 940.
119. For a committee decision to qualify as a board “non-decision” and therefore qualify
for Rales treatment, the committee must consist of less than half of the members of the
board at the time demand would otherwise be required. See Ryan v. Gifford 918 A.2d 341,
353 & n. 29 (Del. Ch. 2007) (“Where at least one half or more of the board in place at the
time the complaint was filed approved the underlying challenged transactions, which
approval may be imputed to the entire board for purposes of proving demand futility, the
Aronson test applies.”).
120. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 912-13. Backdating involves the issuance of options with
exercise prices below the market price of a share at the time of actual grant. If done
explicitly, granting “in the money” options would violate prohibitions imposed by
shareholder-approved stock plans and would have negative consequences under the tax laws
and accounting rules. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000); Financial Accounting Standards Board,
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123: Share-Based Payment (revised 2004)
(hereinafter “FAS 123R”), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas123r.pdf. Backdating
achieves the same economic effect as in-the-money options but avoids such consequences
by pretending the date of grant was really at an earlier time when the share price was equal
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option grants in question were divided among three groups of recipients,
including rank-and-file employees and officers. 121
Importantly, the
shareholders conceded that because of delegation no board action was
taken with respect to any of the grants and that, consequently, Rales was
the appropriate test for their demand futility claim. 122
The Chancery Court analyzed the employee grants and the officer
grants separately. With respect to the former, no directors were
substantively interested or non-independent; therefore, the only question
under Rales was whether the directors faced a substantial threat of personal
liability as a result of the backdating. 123 The employee grants had not been
made by the board or compensation committee, but were instead made by
an executive to whom the compensation committee was assumed to have
delegated authority. 124 Because the directors were not directly involved,
the only claim available to shareholders was that the directors failed in their
duty to oversee the executive to whom they entrusted the power to make
the grants. 125 The court concluded that no substantial likelihood of
personal liability under Caremark existed when there were no allegations
that the board knew a problem existed and failed to take remedial actions to
curtail the executive’s behavior. 126
The court’s analysis of the officer grants is more interesting. The
shareholders did not allege that directors knowingly backdated the officer
grants. 127 However, the court did infer that the compensation committee
approved the amount and recipients of the officer grants. 128 But it refused
to infer that the committee “was involved in the mechanics by which the
options were issued or the dates on which that administrative task was
carried out.” 129 In addition, the court concluded that there would be no
reason to doubt the other directors’ abilities to judge demand fairly, even if
the compensation committee members had breached their fiduciary

to the desired exercise price. The complaint also alleged “spring-loading” and “bulletdodging”—practices which, alternatively, time grants so that they occur in advance of
positive news or time grants so that they occur following negative news. Desimone, 924
A.2d at 915-17.
121. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 913. The third group of recipients was non-employee
directors. Id.
122. Id. at 913-14. The board apparently delegated option-granting power to the
compensation committee for the employee and officer grants, and the non-employee director
grants were self-executing as per the equity plan. Id. at 949.
123. Id. at 938.
124. Id. at 938-39.
125. Id. at 939.
126. See id. at 940 (applying a post-Stone v. Ritter Caremark analysis). For a detailed
description of Caremark duties, see Part V.A infra.
127. Desimone, 924 A.2d at 942.
128. Id.
129. Id.
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duties. 130 These other directors took no part in the granting of options. As
for any duty of oversight claims against the non-committee directors, the
court summarily dismissed the idea, presumably because a board delegates
to a committee specifically to avoid any substantial oversight
responsibility. 131 Thus, the board that avoids managing the option-granting
process by delegating the job to a committee (which, in this case, delegated
the job to management) found itself well protected by Rales and the
limitations inherent in the duty of oversight.
But imagine an alternative world in which the Sycamore board was
more significantly involved in the mechanics of issuing the officer grants.
On the one hand, the directors could have prevented backdating had they
been actively involved. On the other hand, if the backdating nevertheless
occurred, demand would have been judged under Aronson rather than
Rales. Director involvement provides both risk and reward from a
litigation perspective.
To determine whether this matters, one might want to know how a
more active compensation committee or board could have allowed options
to be manipulated.
First, they may have been complicit in the
manipulation. Perhaps the board wanted officers to receive higher
compensation than the circumstances would otherwise allow. 132
Backdating, for instance, would allow payments to be made to the officers
without their full cost appearing in the corporation’s financial statements. 133
Under these circumstances, the board would need to be involved in the
option granting to guarantee the backdating, so any differences between
Rales and Aronson are beside the point.
Alternatively, the active directors could make a mistake. They may
misunderstand the accounting rules, not receive enough information
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 35-36
(describing outrage costs—imposed by shareholders, press, politicians and the public at
large—as a meaningful constraint on directors transferring wealth from the corporation to
executives). Bebchuk and Fried note that the directors’ motivation for making these high
payments run the gamut from the tangible—preserving their seat on the board—to the
intangible—being a “team player” within the corporate hierarchy. Id. at 25-34.
133. For the seminal article on this form of “secret” compensation, see Iman Anabtawi,
Secret Compensation, 82 N.C. L. REV. 835 (2004). See also Opinion 25: Accounting for
Stock Issued to Employees (Accounting Principles Board 1972); ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK
BASED COMPENSATION, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 123 (Fin. Accounting
Standards Bd. 1995). Under FAS 123R, the balance sheet benefit of backdating for
accounting purposes is only the incremental share price increase from the alleged date of
grant to the actual date of grant. Under prior accounting rules, the benefit was more
dramatic because companies took no compensation charge for options that were granted ator out-of-the-money. Thus, backdating allowed companies to remove the entire cost of the
options from their financial statements. ACCOUNTING FOR STOCK BASED COMPENSATION,
Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 123 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1995).
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regarding the accounting and tax implications of backdating, not receive
enough factual information regarding the option grants, or simply make a
terrible error in judgment. In any of these cases, there would seem to be a
colorable due care claim, 134 and there would be a significant risk that
demand would be excused under Aronson’s second prong. As long as the
possibility of director error or ex post judicial error exists, then, Aronson’s
second prong invites directors to delegate decisions away.
Desimone was not the only option backdating case to be decided in
recent years by Delaware courts. The Chancery Court had two other cases
before it alleging improper manipulation of equity awards. In both Ryan v.
Gifford and In re Tyson Foods, Inc. Shareholder Litigation, defendant
directors moved to dismiss the respective derivative suits for failure to
make a demand. 135 In both Ryan and Tyson, the motion was denied. 136
Finally, in both Ryan and Tyson, the boards had taken action regarding
equity awards that formed the basis of the complaints. 137 Admittedly, Ryan
and Tyson involved allegations of intentional disloyalty by the board,
neither of which was alleged with any particularity in Desimone, even with
respect to the compensation committee members themselves. 138 We should
expect directors who are lining their own pockets or those of their friends
to be treated more harshly than those who seem only asleep at the wheel.
Nevertheless, it may seem to some that board inaction fares better in
litigation than does board action. One cannot help thinking that directors or
their advisers who think about these cases are likely to see the litigation
advantages to be gained by delegating authority over such decisions. 139
C.

The Managerial Board

If Rales and Aronson combine to promote overdelegation, the question
remains whether increased delegation by boards is problematic. Much
recent corporate law commentary recommends that directors play a greater
role in the corporate decision-making process. 140 Of course, board
134. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 275-83.
135. Ryan v. Gifford, 918 A.2d at 351-52 (Del. Ch. 2007); In re Tyson Foods, Inc.
Consol. S’holder Litig., 919 A.2d 563, 583 (Del. Ch. 2007).
136. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 354-55; Tyson, 919 A.2d at 583-84.
137. Ryan, 918 A.2d at 353 (noting that “one half of the current board members
approved each challenged transaction”); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 573-79. See also Ryan, 918
A.2d at 355-56 (stating that the Chancery Court also judged demand futility under Rales and
determined that demand would have been excused even under that test because a majority of
the board members faced a substantial risk of personal liability).
138. Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 929-30 (Del. Ch. 2007).
139. As in Desimone, the delegation need not be full. It need only be a delegation of the
part of the process carrying a high litigation risk, in this case, the “mechanics” of the option
granting.
140. See, e.g., Eric A. Reitman, Panacea Later: A Critical Evaluation of the Board
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involvement in that process can mean different things. On the one hand,
the full board can actively make decisions over certain spheres of corporate
activity. On the other hand, the full board can delegate to management and
thereafter monitor management’s performance. In between, the board can
delegate authority over certain activities to committees of the board, which
must then make separate determinations as to retaining the authority or
delegating it further to management. 141 Advocating for a more active board
does not commit one to the view that boards should not ever delegate.
In fact, there are reasons to think that delegation of either type—to
committees or to management—can be a good thing. A certain amount of
delegation to management is necessary for the efficient operation of a large
firm. 142 Moreover, as corporations have increasingly turned to independent
directors, delegation to management may be desirable if independent
directors lack the firm-specific information needed to manage
effectively. 143 As for committees, their use allows boards to select
decision-makers who may bring expertise in specialized areas. 144
Moreover, although independent directors on these committees may suffer
from informational deficiencies relative to corporate insiders, they will
likely suffer less than the other directors from managerial capture. 145
While delegation (and monitoring) may be an appropriate role for

Orthodoxy in Corporate Governance Scholarship and Proposal of a Board-less Alternative
for the Diffusely Owned Public Corporation, 1 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 239 (2006) (observing
and criticizing the central role that board action plays in corporate governance scholarship).
For a selection of just the most recent scholars to assume or explicitly state that directors
should be more involved in some level of corporate decision-making, see, e.g., Elizabeth
Cosenza, The Holy Grail of Corporate Governance Reform: Independence or Democracy,
2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (2007); Eric M. Fogel and Andrew M. Geier, Strangers in the
House: Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the Independent Board of Directors, 32 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 33, 67-71 (2007) (arguing for the establishment of shareholder-directors who will
become more involved in monitoring management); Nowicki, supra note 93, at 481-90
(suggesting the employment of “professional directors” as a means of better corporate
governance).
141. As noted above, stock exchanges have begun to require or encourage the use by
listed companies of certain board committees.
142. See, e.g., Kenneth Arrow, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 68-70 (1974). Also refer
to Roberta S. Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: The Means to What End?, 52
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 534 (1984) (describing the efficiency costs imposed by board
involvement).
143. See Fisch, supra note 97, at 283.
144. See, e.g., Anup Agrawal & Shiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting
Scandals, 48 J.L. & ECON. 371, 394-96 (2005) (discussing the impact of accounting
expertise on board audit committees).
145. See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Peter D. Favorite, Multidisciplinary Practice and the
Future of the Legal Profession: Considering a Role for Independent Directors, 32 LOY. U.
CHI. L.J. 577, 609 (2001); Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of
Directors and Performance of the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
1283, 1291 (1998).
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most boards with respect to most decisions, it is not necessarily true that all
boards should delegate all decisions. Boards may very well have a
managing function in addition to a monitoring function, which includes,
inter alia, strategic planning, reviewing the structure of significant
corporate transactions and making compensation decisions. 146 Some of
these functions are practically non-delegable, regardless of the incentives
created by the demand requirement. 147 Others, like CEO compensation, are
more or less subject to forced delegation. 148 Between the two extremes,
however, lies a broad swath of corporate decision-making in respect of
which directors may decide whether or not to delegate their authority. 149
Left to their own devices, we can expect a fair amount of
heterogeneity as boards come to different conclusions as to how best to
strike the balance between managing and monitoring. However, Aronson
and Rales combine to provide an exogenous push towards delegation with
subsequent monitoring. Incentives to deviate from a particular board’s
management/delegation baseline towards more delegation should give one
pause. A board’s decision to fully delegate to management and exclusively
adopt a monitoring role may not always be optimal. Monitoring by outside
directors is likely to be imperfect and may provide management with the
breathing room in which to make decisions that fail to maximize firm
value. The non-litigation advantages of delegation may often outweigh the
advantages of board decision-making. But unless that is always the case,
the incentives created by the differing demand regimes toward more
delegation will cause some amount of harm.
There are at least some reasons to suspect that it is not the case that
board delegation will always be the best decision. As a response to the
regulatory requirements discussed above, committees established by boards
tend to consist solely of independent directors. 150 These independent
directors are less likely to have the most extensive information regarding a
corporation. Accordingly, they may not be capable of making the best
decisions for the corporation in certain contexts. 151 Alternatively, increased

146. See Fisch, supra note 97, at 272-74 (“Board function need not be viewed solely in
terms of monitoring management.”)
147. Consider approval of a dissolution where a board was comprised of solely
disinterested directors.
148. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
149. See Fisch, supra note 97, at 285 (noting that the appropriate management role of
boards may extend past non-delegable duties for certain firms in certain circumstances).
150. Boards seeking to delegate to committees to take advantage of Rales outside of the
contexts proscribed by regulations could certainly establish ad hoc committees consisting, in
part, of inside directors.
151. An obvious example of this phenomenon can be observed with respect to
compensation committee decisions relative to executives with whom the committee has
little interaction or over whom the committee has less regular oversight.
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usage of committees may cause resentment and antagonism on boards,
impairing the ability of boards to operate optimally. 152 Moreover, larger
groups (such as boards) may perform better than smaller groups (like
committees) or individuals. 153
Finally, even if delegation and subsequent monitoring were always
advisable, many of the activities that traditionally fall within “monitoring”
require some board action. 154 Good monitoring will often require board
decision-making, 155 particularly when the monitor needs to express
disapproval of the delegate’s actions and effect a change of course. Thus,
Aronson’s second prong may even provide monitors with incentive to
delegate more and monitor less.
V.

OBJECTIONS

This Article has contended that (1) Aronson’s second prong allocates
authority away from the board even in instances where Delaware courts
have not traditionally viewed a board as compromised and (2) when
combined with the different test for demand futility in Rales, that second
prong provides incentives for rational boards to take a less active role in
corporate decision-making than they might have otherwise.
The latter argument—that Aronson and Rales combine to create
incentives for overdelegation—invites at least two critiques. First, it may
be that boards’ incentives to delegate have been diminished by recent
Delaware jurisprudence announcing directors’ obligations to act in good
faith. Good faith is a prerequisite for coverage under exculpatory statutes,
and therefore key to evaluating the likelihood of potential director liability
under Rales. If excessive delegation leads to an absence of good faith, 156
then this line of cases may provide a practical solution to the
overdelegation problem.
152. See Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, The Qualified Legal Compliance
Committee: Using the Attorney Conduct Rules to Restructure the Board of Directors, 53
DUKE L.J. 517, 544 (2003).
153. See Bainbridge supra note 21, at 42-43 (discussing advantages of large boards
versus small boards).
154. See Fisch, supra note 97, at 270-71 (“Recent efforts to improve board monitoring
have included revising director qualification standards to encourage greater use of directors
without relationships that could interfere with independent action . . . Committees are
particularly useful for effecting board monitoring because they allow independent directors
to make decisions free from the risk of domination by insiders.”) (emphasis added).
155. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Independent Directors and the ALI Corporate
Governance Project, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1034, 1064 (1993) (“Monitoring the
performance of senior executives is the board's major function, but that necessarily involves
activities that can best be described as managing the corporation.”).
156. See Nowicki, supra note 93 (noting the danger in conflating “not in good faith”
with “bad faith”).
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The second criticism applies to both the board authority and
overdelegation points. One might agree that the demand requirement
provides incentives for boards to delegate away more of their authority than
they would otherwise choose. One might further agree that Aronson’s
second prong fails to give enough deference to board authority in
circumstances where they are unlikely to face personal liability.
Nevertheless, one might point out that the demand requirement is only one
part of the litigation process.
The subsequent (and sometimes
simultaneous) step—a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)—allows a
board protected by an exculpatory clause to move for dismissal and nip any
litigation in the bud, even if demand is excused under Aronson’s second
prong. Thus the exculpatory clause may still provide an effective safety net
for the directors just beyond the demand stage. If so, this would eliminate
any practical differences between the decision-making board and the
delegating board regarding demand futility and would minimize any
incursion on board authority.
A.

Good Faith as a Check on Overdelegation

Key to the overdelegation analysis in Part IV is the idea that the Rales
test provides a relatively safe landing spot for boards who delegated away
decision-making authority over a broad array of decisions. Under the Rales
test, and assuming no obvious director interest or non-independence with
respect to the underlying matter, demand is excused only when directors
face a substantial likelihood of personal liability. Considering the ubiquity
of exculpatory clauses, this requires that shareholders allege with
particularity that directors have breached their duty of good faith. 157 If
overdelegation demonstrates an absence of good faith, then directors would
not be protected by the exculpation statute. Consequently, the Rales test
would be satisfied and board delegation would not receive preferential
treatment for demand futility purposes.
In Delaware, directors owe shareholders a duty of oversight, i.e. a duty
to monitor subordinates. Chancellor Allen first outlined the modern
version of this duty in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative
Litigation. Prior to Caremark, the duty of oversight was invoked only
when directors had cause to suspect that management or employees were
involved in illicit or harmful behavior. 158 To some extent, ignorance was

157. Loyalty claims to the extent distinct from good faith claims would also qualify to
make directors personally liable.
158. See Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 130 (Del. 1963) (“[A]bsent
a cause for suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a corporate
system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have no reason to suspect exists.”).
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bliss. 159 Caremark retreated from that limited conception of a board’s
oversight responsibility. The duty of oversight would always be “active”
but would only be violated by a sustained or systematic failure of the board
to exercise oversight. 160 A failure to oversee rises to that level if (1) no
reporting system or controls was implemented or (2) the board consciously
failed to monitor or oversee those systems that do exist. 161 Chancellor
Allen noted the high bar imposed by this standard, but observed: “[A]
demanding test of liability in the oversight context is probably beneficial to
corporate shareholders as a class, as it is in the board decision context,
since it makes board service by qualified persons more likely, while
continuing to act as a stimulus to good faith performance of duty by such
directors.” 162
Caremark was understood to be a duty-of-care case. 163 Chancellor
Allen did, however, use the phrase “good faith” in describing the duty of
oversight and the test to be applied. The use of “good faith” implicated
Section 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses, but Caremark did not specifically
discuss the relationship between the duty of oversight and exculpation
clauses. 164 The issue was not relevant in the case because the court was
deciding whether to approve a settlement that imposed no personal liability
onto the directors. 165
The connection between oversight and good faith (and therefore
Section 102(b)(7) exculpation clauses) was first given significant judicial
attention in the now-famous Disney litigation. 166 Although the Disney
directors were ultimately held to have satisfied their duties of good faith,
the Disney cases made clear that a breach of the duty of oversight would
not be exculpable under Section 102(b)(7) clauses because the duty of
oversight was a species of the duty of good faith.

159. See Bainbridge, supra note 1, at 293-94 (advocating the “every dog gets one bite”
rule, under which analogy the “dog” is management or other employees and the dog’s
“owner” who won’t be liable to the first victim of the dog is the board)
160. See In re Caremark Int’l. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, at 971.
161. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, at 370 (approving the Caremark test).
162. Id. (emphasis omitted)
163. See supra note 78; Hill & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 841 and n. 36 (noting that
Caremark characterized the question of good faith as “coming within the duty of care” and
citing authority for that proposition).
164. Chancellor Allen did cite Baxter’s dismissal of a similar suit because of the
existence of an exculpatory clause as support for his conclusion that the shareholders’
claims in Caremark “quite likely were susceptible to a motion to dismiss in all events.” 698
A.2d 959, at 971, fn 28.
165. Id. at 960.
166. See generally In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342 (Del. Ch.
1998) (“Disney I”); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); In re Walt Disney Co.
Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275 (Del. Ch. 2003) (“Disney II”); In re Walt Disney Co., 2004
WL 2050138 (Del. Ch. 2004) (“Disney III”); Disney IV; and Disney V.
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The facts of the Disney cases have been summarized more fully
elsewhere but a brief summary will be helpful. 167 Disney needed to hire a
second-in-command to serve under CEO Michael Eisner and Eisner settled
on Michael Ovitz. According to its governing documents, Disney’s board
was charged with appointing all officers, including the President (the
Furthermore, the compensation
position to be held by Ovitz). 168
committee’s charter charged it with approving all compensation for the
President and all employment contracts of Disney officers. 169 Ovitz and the
company negotiated a pay package (including very generous severance
terms), the committee approved the package and the board elected Ovitz as
President. The committee’s approval and the board’s election occurred
after a process that, according to the court, “fell significantly short of the
best practices of ideal corporate governance.” 170 Specifically, it was
unclear until trial whether any of the Disney directors had quantified the
severance potentially owed to Ovitz.
Within a short period of time, Ovitz’ employment was terminated and
he received the severance payment. Shareholders filed a derivative suit
claiming, inter alia, violations by the Disney directors of their duties of
loyalty, due care and good faith. A trial eventually ensued, after which
Chancellor Chandler held that the directors had not breached any fiduciary
duties. The Delaware Supreme Court subsequently affirmed that decision
in Disney V.
The Disney V decision need not have spent much energy on a
discussion of the duty of good faith. As the court noted, the shareholders
argued that the directors had acted in bad faith because they had acted
without due care. 171 The court agreed that the shareholders had not proven
any violation of the duty of care, so they necessarily failed to prove bad
faith. 172
Nevertheless, the court went on to outline the contours of the duty of
good faith in dicta. First and contrary to plaintiff’s contentions, mere lack
of due care—gross negligence—was not enough to demonstrate an absence
of good faith. 173 Most importantly for present purposes, the court noted
that the duty of good faith could be violated “where the fiduciary
167. See, e.g., Hill & McDonnell, supra note 8, at 843-845 (reviewing the main facts in
the Disney litigation).
168. Disney IV, 907 A.2d at 771.
169. Id. at 763-64.
170. Id. at 697.
171. See Disney V, 906 A.2d at 63.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 64-66. The court recognized the need to distinguish due care from good faith
based on the legislature’s passage of (1) § 102(b)(7) and (2) § 145(a) and (b) and the
distinction those statutes make between acts taken in good faith and those taken in bad faith.
For criticism of this approach, see Bainbridge et al., supra note 78, at 33-34.
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intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act, demonstrating a
conscious disregard for his duties.” 174 Equating a conscious disregard of
duties with an absence of good faith meant that a breach of the oversight
duty (along with other conscious breaches) would not be exculpable under
Section 102(b)(7) provisions.
Soon after Disney V came the Supreme Court’s decision in Stone v.
Ritter. Stone was another case concerning an alleged breach of a board’s
duty of good faith via the duty of oversight. The court in Stone explicitly
adopted the Caremark “sustained or systematic failure” standard for
evaluating oversight liability, and went on to note that such a standard was
fully consistent with the “conscious disregard of duties” standard set forth
in Disney V. 175 In particular, Stone held that liability in the oversight
context “requires a showing that directors knew that they were not
discharging their fiduciary duties.” 176
In sum: if directors violate their duty of oversight announced in the
Caremark/Disney/Stone line of cases, they face a substantial likelihood of
personal liability for oversight claims because they would not be
exculpated for their lack of good faith. Accordingly, one might think that
Rales’ demand futility test provides no comfort for boards whose
delegation created a colorable claim for breach of the oversight duty.
Nevertheless, three considerations cut against that conclusion. First,
the delegation that is contemplated by the duty of oversight is delegation to
management. There does not seem to be a judicially recognized duty of the
board to monitor a board committee. Thus, the duty of oversight provides
no disincentive for overdelegation to committees.
Second, leaving committee delegation aside, directors may violate
their good faith obligations by failing to monitor management to whom
they delegate. That does not mean that directors violate those obligations
by failing to actively make decisions. Delegation itself does not violate the
duty of oversight—it merely activates it. Considering the informational
disadvantages they face relative to the actors they are supposed to oversee,
we have reason to be concerned that boards will systematically fail to
rigorously monitor management, even if that failure does not rise to a
Caremark violation.
Third, even if good oversight is difficult, directors have little reason to
worry that shareholders will be able to meet the Caremark/Stone test.
Indeed, one scholar described the standard announced in Caremark “more
like a Potemkin village than a revolution,” “requir[ing] a showing of some
extreme directorial misconduct when it c[omes] to monitoring the activities
174. See Disney V, at 67 (emphasis added) (quoting Chancellor Chandler’s language
from Disney IV).
175. See Stone, 911 A.2d at 369.
176. Id. at 370 (citing Guttman, 823 A.2d at 506).
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of subordinates.” 177 Caremark duties are so hard to violate that there has
been only one instance—an unpublished opinion—in which a Delaware
court held directors liable for breach of the oversight duty. 178
In a slightly different context, the duty of good faith had been treated
expansively by at least one court. In Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Co., 179
Lyondell’s directors had approved a merger of the company with Basell
AF, wherein Lyondell’s shareholders were cashed out for $13 billion, or
$48 per share. Lyondell’s shareholders sued, claiming breach of the duty
of care and breach of the duty of loyalty, the latter on “good faith,”
disclosure and “financial self-interest” grounds. 180 As to due care, the
plaintiffs alleged that the directors violated their Revlon duties 181 by failing
to actively take steps to ensure that the sales process would achieve the
highest price available for the shareholders. 182 Defendants countered that
Lyondell’s charter contained an exculpation clause shielding directors from
liability for due care breaches. 183 Plaintiffs responded that the Revlon
claims, which sounded in the duty of care, nonetheless implicated the duty
of good faith (and were therefore non-exculpable) because the directors
knew they were violating their Revlon duties. In a somewhat surprising
ruling, 184 Vice Chancellor Noble denied the directors’ motion for summary
judgment based on the exculpation clause because “[t]he record, as it

177. See
Harry
Gerla,
Caremark
—
The
Failed
Revolution,
http://www.theracetothebottom.org/home/caremarkthe-failed-revolution.html.
178. See ATR-Kim Eng Financial Corp. v. Araneta, 2006 WL 3783520 (Del. Ch. 2006).
In a recent opinion, Vice Chancellor Strine allowed an oversight claim to survive a motion
to dismiss where the claim only involved a Caremark-type legal compliance issue. See In re
American Int’l Group, Inc., 965 A.2d 763 (Del. Ch. 2009).
179. Ryan v. Lyondell Chemical Co., 2008 WL 2923427 (Del.Ch., July 29, 2008).
180. Id. at 1-3.
181. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del.
1986) (formulating the concept of Revlon duties that are owed in the context of mergers).
182. See Lyondell, 2008 WL 2923427 at *1. Plaintiffs also complained that the directors
had adopted preclusive and coercive deal protection measures in violation of Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) and Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare,
Inc., 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).
183. Id. at *18.
184. See
Posting
of
Jeff
Lipshaw
to
Legal
Profession
Blog,
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/legal_profession/2008/07/reactions-to-ry.html (July 31,
2008) (reacting to the Delaware Court of Chancery’s ruling in Ryan v. Lyondell); Eric
Chiappinelli, Delaware Court of Chancery on Good Faith and the Duty of Loyalty in a
Revlon Setting, CASES AND MATERIALS ON BUSINESS ENTITIES: NEW DEVELOPMENTS,
http://businessentitiesonline.typepad.com/new_developments/2008/08/delaware-court.html
(denouncing the ruling). But see Gordon Smith, Boosters of “The Fiduciary Duty of Good
CONGLOMERATE,
Aug.
13,
2008,
Faith”
Rejoice,
THE
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2008/08/boosters-of-the.html (observing that Ryan was “a
pretty safe and uncontroversial ruling”). Additionally, under a relatively similar fact
pattern, another member of the Chancery Court came down on the other side of the good
faith issue. See McPadden v. Sidhu, 2008 WL 4017052 (Del. Ch. 2008).
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presently stands, does not, as a matter of undisputed material fact,
demonstrate the Lyondell directors' good faith discharge of their Revlon
duties—a known set of ‘duties’ requiring certain conduct or impeccable
knowledge of the market in the face of Basell's offer to acquire the
Company.” 185
Any expansion of good faith in Ryan was short-lived. After taking an
interlocutory appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled, among other
things, that a good faith claim could be stated “[o]nly if [the board]
knowingly and completely failed to undertake their responsibilities” and
that the proper inquiry for a good faith claim is whether the board “utterly
failed” to attempt to fulfill its duties. 186 After Ryan, consider a board faced
with a set of decisions having a high due-care risk profile—perhaps
incentive compensation for non-CEO employees—. Why not hand those
decisions off to management? The directors could theoretically be inviting
a Caremark/Stone claim. But the well-advised board might simply
establish maximum limits on aggregate awards and might require
management to comply with a minimal periodic reporting system.
Under these circumstances, there would not be an “utter failure” to
establish an oversight system. And the minimal oversight system is not
likely to show that the directors were consciously disabling themselves
from being informed of risks that required their attention. Exactly what
risks required the directors’ attention? Perhaps, in light of recent
backdating scandals, directors should know that there is a serious
accounting (and therefore securities fraud) risk in improperly administering
stock compensation programs. However, the Desimone decision indicates
otherwise. Shareholders there argued that the directors failed to oversee
the executives to whom they delegated option-granting “mechanics,” at
least for awards made to officers and employees. The Chancery Court held
that the failure to oversee the executives was not a violation of good faith,
in part because the court refused to infer that directors knew that options
were being backdated. 187 It was not enough to allege failure to oversee in
the context of the general risk posed by equity grants. Instead, to satisfy
the Caremark/Stone standard, the ignored risks had to be more companyspecific to be deemed “known” by directors. It seems to be the case that
“[a]s long as the board has put something in place, courts are almost certain
185. See Lyondell, 2008 WL 2923427, at *19.
186. Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 2009 WL 1024764 at *7 (Del. 2009).
187. See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, at 940-42. Hillary Sale argues that, in
failing to notice backdating, a compensation committee “may have breached their good-faith
obligations.” Supra note 76, at 749-50. If Desimone is correct, though, compensation
committees will not be liable for backdating that occurs under their watch absent a reason to
suspect wrongdoing. Given the uproar surrounding the problems associated with equity
compensation, it is doubtful, a fortiori, that other compensation decisions would subject
committees to anything more demanding than the Desimone analysis.
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to defer to the board . . . absent further suspicious facts.” 188
Even if knowledge of ignored risks could be inferred in the
“suspicious” option-granting context, it says nothing about other areas,
such as employment contracts, that don’t involve the possibility of
securities fraud. In Disney, there was no statutory requirement that the
board elect Ovitz as President or that the compensation committee approve
his employment contract. Those lines of authority were established in the
company’s governing documents. A corporation could just as easily not
require its board to be involved in such decisions. 189 In fact, many of a
company’s largest employment contracts may be negotiated solely by
management without any input from the board. 190 It is hard to imagine that
a pro forma oversight process regarding such contracts would violate the
duty of good faith. In fact, the Chancery Court was explicit in its final
Disney decision that, to the extent no governing document required
management to keep the board involved in the employment agreement
negotiation, Eisner’s behavior could not have violated the law. 191
Thus, the duty of oversight should do little to cause directors to alter
their management/delegation preferences significantly. This is not to say
that Caremark and Stone are wrongly decided or too director-friendly. The
extremely high bar set in Stone follows Chancellor Allen’s observation in
Caremark that a violation of the duty of oversight “is possibly the most
difficult theory in corporation law upon which a plaintiff might hope to win
a judgment.” 192 Given the need to delegate at least some amount of
corporate decision-making, it would be difficult to attract directors if they
faced significant personal liability simply because of that delegation.
However, the duty of oversight should not be expected to establish a
substantial likelihood of personal liability for any but the most egregiously
bad monitor. And even this assumes that the board did not first delegate to
a board committee. In that case, as discussed above, Rales will likely
always apply and boards will apparently receive the full protection of the
demand requirement without necessarily reaching a Caremark/Stone
analysis. Accordingly, the duty of good faith cannot carry much weight in
the struggle to reduce the incentives to overdelegate.

188. Hill & McDonnell, supra note 79, at 1792.
189. Shareholders may object to the absence of such provisions, of course.
190. One can imagine the negotiations between a star news anchor and a television
network or a professional athlete and a team owned by a corporation.
191. See Disney IV, 907 A.2d 693, 763 (noting, however, that such actions did not
“comport with how fiduciaries of Delaware corporations are expected to act”).
192. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 967.
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The § 102(b)(7) Motion to Dismiss as a Safety Valve

The second objection to the argument about overdelegation proceeds
from an observation about procedure. It applies equally to concerns
outlined in Part III regarding board authority. One might agree that
directors are better off, in terms of avoiding personal liability, by
delegating authority. But perhaps that result has more to do with the
impossible-to-meet Caremark/Stone standard than any distinction between
Rales and Aronson. Indeed, the heavy burden of establishing a breach of
good faith through the duty of oversight is likely more important to boards
than any difference between the two demand futility tests. 193
Along this line, although duty of care claims may be problematic for
directors at the demand stage under Aronson, those directors can
immediately move to dismiss the claims if exculpated under their
corporation's charters. If those motions are as effective in protecting
directors as a properly structured demand futility test would be, directors
should have no preference between board action and board non-action.
Similarly, any blow to board authority arising from Aronson’s second
prong would be softened by the availability of a contemporaneous motion
to dismiss.
It is true that Delaware courts have made it generally easy for
directors to have duty of care claims extinguished through the invocation of
exculpatory clauses. Defendant directors may invoke the clause at the
motion to dismiss stage after demand has been deemed futile. 194 Such a
clause disposes of the suit “where the factual basis for a claim solely
implicates a violation of the duty of care.” 195 Assuming the shareholder
complaint did not raise the issue of the exculpatory clause, a motion to
dismiss on the basis of such a clause is converted into a motion for
summary judgment. 196 Although a summary judgment motion, the
“floodgates of discovery” are not necessarily opened to plaintiffs. 197 For all
193. Unlike the distinction between test in Rales and Aronson, however, Caremark’s
permissive treatment of director oversight is at least explainable: the board has limited
resources with which to monitor management and a more stringent test would discourage
people from becoming directors. See, e.g., supra note 142 and accompanying text; see also
Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Ch. 1996) (describing the
protections provided for directors' actions made in good faith as an “elementary precept of
corporation”).
194. See Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1092 (Del. 2001) (discussing when a
Section 102(b)(7) defense can be raised).
195. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1224 (Del. 1999) (emphasis in
original).
196. See Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1092 (specifically describing the process of this
conversion).
197. Id. at 1091 (limiting discovery in this context to “a scope that is coextensive with
the [exculpatory clause] issue necessary to resolve the motion”).
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intents and purposes, then, exculpatory clauses can be used to terminate a
due-care-only derivative suit at a very early stage in litigation.
However, two procedural aspects of motions to dismiss on the basis of
exculpation—relevant pleading standards and burdens of proof—pose
problems. Importantly, failure-to-make-demand motions are judged under
“stringent” pleading standards requiring factual particularity. 198 Plaintiffs
must set forth the factual statements that are “essential to the claim.” 199
Courts again may make inferences in a plaintiff’s favor, but the inferences
may only be drawn from particularized facts. 200
Motions to dismiss (or summary judgment motions) based on
exculpatory clauses are subject to more relaxed standards. In many cases,
the motions are judged strictly on the pleadings, and therefore under notice
pleading standards established by Chancery Rule 8(a). 201 Notice pleading
requires the reviewing court to assume all well-pleaded allegations in the
complaint and dismiss a complaint only if the court has “‘reasonable
certainty’ that the plaintiff could prevail on no set of facts that may be
inferred from the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint.” 202 As
Chancellor Chandler has recently noted: “To survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, a plaintiff need only plead so as to give notice of the claim; even
vague allegations, so long as they give the opposing party notice of the
claim, are well-pleaded.” 203 Importantly, particularity is not required. 204
Instead, a court may make inferences from “general, if not conclusory,
allegations.” 205
Delaware courts are not shy about describing the
magnitude of difference between Rule 23.1 pleading and notice pleading
requirements. 206 Indeed, at least one court has noted that the disparities
between 23.1 and 8(a) would cause it to decide a motion differently. 207
198. See, e.g., Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254 (describing how the pleading in derivative suits
differ than those governed strictly by Chancery Rule (8)(a)).
199. Id.
200. See Tyson, 919 A.2d at 582 (describing procedure in the Rule 23.1 context).
201. See DEL. CT. CH. R. 8(a).
202. Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1082-83.
203. McPadden, 2008 WL 4017052, at *6.
204. See Desimone, 924 A.2d at 928 (describing differences between the Rule 23.1 and
12(b)(6) standards).
205. Tyson, 919 A.2d at 582
206. See, e.g., Brehm, 746 A.2d at 254 (“[Rule 23.1’s pleading requirements] differ
substantially from the permissive notice pleadings governed solely by Chancery Rule
8(a).”); Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1083 (“This [notice pleading] standard . . . is less stringent
than the standard applied when evaluating whether a pre-suit demand has been excused in a
stockholder derivative suit filed pursuant to Chancery Rule 23.1.”) (internal quotations
omitted); Tyson, 919 A.2d at 582 (“The inquiries differ, however, in the level of detail
demanded of the plaintiffs’ allegations and the directors at whom the inquiry is directed.”)
207. See Tyson, 919 A.2d at 582-83 (“[S]ome defendant directors are alleged to be
sufficiently entangled to be lacking independence for 12(b)(6) purposes, but would be given
the benefit of the doubt under the stricter standard of Rule 23.1.”).
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In addition to the level of particularity required of a plaintiff, demand
futility and exculpation motions are different insofar as they place the
burden of persuasion on different parties. Under Rule 23.1, the burden is
on the plaintiff to show demand futility. In a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
based on an exculpation clause, the burden is placed on the defendant
directors to demonstrate that there is no allegation that they failed to act in
good faith. 208 In short, motions to dismiss based on exculpation clauses are
not as favorable to directors as Rule 23.1 motions. 209
Consider the conscious disregard species of good faith violations
described earlier. Whether one consciously disregarded his or her duties
turns, of course, on a determination about state of mind. Yet, a director’s
state of mind is often difficult to evaluate with any degree of confidence
due to non-observability and the potential for mixed motivations. 210 These
weaknesses are only exacerbated when the analysis must proceed (1)
before discovery (2) under notice pleading standards when judges must
decide that there are no set of facts they could infer from the well-pleaded
allegations that would allow plaintiffs to prevail and (3) with the burden of
proving the absence of bad faith allegations on the defendant.
Contrast this with the situation facing directors in a delegation case.
Assuming an exculpatory clause and no other interest—or independence—
related facts, Rule 23.1 and Rales require a well-pleaded allegation of the
ultimate fact—that the directors knew they were disabling themselves from
discharging their duties when they delegated the relevant decision to
management. 211 Given the wide berth afforded directors with respect to
delegation, that is a difficult test indeed, highlighting the importance of the
208. Emerald Partners, 726 A.2d at 1223-24 (describing how the burden lies with the
party seeking the statute’s protection).
209. In In re Lear, 2008 WL 4053221, at *7, Vice Chancellor Strine took the novel
approach of incorporating an analysis of an exculpation clause’s applicability in to a
demand futility analysis under Aronson’s second prong. This move would solve many of
the problems described in this Article. However, it is not clear that the incorporation of
exculpation considerations into a second-prong analysis is consistent with Delaware law as
discussed in this Part. Along this line, the two cases cited in support of the move, Guttman
and McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 501-02 (Del. Ch. 2000), are cases
operating under the Rales framework and not Aronson. The Supreme Court has effectively
incorporated exculpation into its analysis of Aronson’s second prong in the LLC context.
See Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 140-41 (Del. 2008). The opinion in Wood, however, did
not explain how Aronson’s second prong invited any consideration of the exculpation
clause, citing to Guttman (Rales case), Stone (Rales case), Malpiede (12(b)(6) motion),
Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001) (rejecting recourse to an exculpation
clause at the demand stage where entire fairness is necessarily the standard of review), and
Desimone (Rales case).
210. See, e.g., Einer Elhuage, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 778 (2005) (contrasting what is entailed in subjective and objective
inquiries into directors’ motives).
211. See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
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demand futility test.
There is an additional distinction to be made between dismissals for
failure to make demand and dismissals based on exculpatory clauses. Only
directors receive the benefit of exculpation. 212 Even if a subsequent motion
to dismiss insulates directors from liability, it has no effect on executive
liability. When Aronson’s second prong is met, directors are stripped of
litigation-related authority. Aside from establishing a special litigation
committee, they are unable to decide whether pursuing an action against an
executive is in the corporation’s best interests. Even if the suit is
subsequently dismissed against the directors based on an exculpation
clause, the directors remain powerless to make litigation decisions
regarding the suit against the executive. Thus, in the case of a due care
claim against director coupled with any claim against an executive,
Aronson’s second prong will reallocate authority to shareholder plaintiffs
even if there is no potential liability for directors. 213
VI. REVISING ARONSON
The incentives towards overdelegation outlined in Part IV can be fixed
either by making Rales more like Aronson or, alternatively, by making
Aronson more like Rales. 214 Taking the former scenario, assuming board
delegation, courts could inquire into the existence of a valid business
judgment with respect to the Original Decision by whomever other than the
full board acted for the corporation—either a board committee or an
employee. If there was a reason to doubt the validity of that business
judgment, then demand could be excused. The Rales test would then
provide no more protection than the Aronson test and directors would have
no incentive to overdelegate. 215 Taking the latter scenario, assuming board
action, application of Aronson’s second prong would simply require
investigation of whether a majority of the board faced a substantial
likelihood of personal liability as a result of that decision. 216 If not, perhaps
because the claim is exculpated under a 102(b)(7) clause, demand would be

212. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7).
213. For an example of such a case, see McPadden v. Sidhu, 2008 WL 4017052 (Del.
Ch. 2008). Of course, this result is not likely troubling to those who are concerned with
structural bias on the part of directors in favor of executives.
214. Admittedly, one might be willing to pay the price of overdelegation if they
believed that boards are less capable of responding to demands in director-action suits than
those in director-non-action.
215. Indeed, that approach would likely provide directors with less protection in
practicality because they would be completely reliant on another party, the delegate, to
determine whether demand is futile.
216. Even more elegant would be the substitution of the test described in Desimone, 924
A.2d at 935-36.
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required. Again, the Rales test would provide no more protection than the
Aronson test and directors would have no incentive to overdelegate.
Having controlled for distorted incentives for delegation under either
solution, the choice between the two comes down to one’s view of board
authority. As a practical matter, it is safe to say that changing Rales to look
more like Aronson would be a significant departure for Delaware law. It
would be hard to imagine Delaware courts letting shareholders control
corporate litigation where (1) the underlying misconduct was that of an
employee, (2) a majority of directors had no personal interest in the
misconduct, and (3) a majority of the board did not face a substantial
likelihood of personal liability based on the failure to monitor. In short, no
one complains much about Rales.
At a more substantive level, broader applicability of Rales is less
troublesome than broader applicability of Aronson. As discussed earlier,
all things being equal, boards are in a better position than courts to
calculate the costs and benefits of pursuing derivative litigation. The cost
of excluding boards from that decision-making process when they face no
threat of personal liability seems to be relatively high in comparison to the
costs of leaving it up to potentially, but not necessarily, biased directors to
pursue such actions.
The best solution, therefore, is to revise Aronson’s second prong.
Instead of asking whether an Original Decision was the product of a valid
business judgment, the operative question should be whether there is a
reasonable doubt that a majority of the board faced a substantial likelihood
of personal liability. 217
217. Revising Aronson might also solve another issue spelled out by Vice Chancellor
Strine in his law review article. See Leo E. Strine, The Inescapably Empirical Foundation
of the Common Law of Corporations, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 499 (2002) [hereinafter Empirical
Foundation]. The following description of the problem tracks Strine’s hypothetical. Id. at
504-10.
Imagine a corporation, S, that has a dominant shareholder, D. D wants to transact
with S. A majority of S’s board are independent directors with no ties to D. The transaction
is approved by the independent directors (the “dependent” directors having abstained) and
S’s shareholders file a derivative suit.
Reconsider Aronson’s two prongs:
disinterest/independence relating to the Original Decision and otherwise valid business
judgment as to the Original Decision. Assume that the decision by the five independent
directors would be considered an exercise of valid business judgment. One would expect
demand to be required unless there was reason to suspect that the directors were not really
independent of D under Aronson’s first prong.
But because D is a majority shareholder, the business judgment rule is inapplicable.
See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 92-93 (Del. 2001). Instead, the entire
fairness test is applied. Id. Approval by disinterested directors merely shifts the burden of
proving fairness from the directors and D to the plaintiffs. See, e.g., id. at 95. When entire
fairness is the test, how does Aronson’s second prong come out at the demand stage? It may
be that the application of the entire fairness test automatically means failure of Aronson’s
second prong, notwithstanding an independent, disinterested board making an informed,
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VII. CONCLUSION
Aronson and its two-pronged test have undoubtedly stood the test of
time. And, understandably, almost twenty-five years of seniority brings
with it a degree of immunity from criticism. Nevertheless, this Article has
made the case that Aronson, its second prong in particular, should be
criticized. The second prong removes board discretion over a class of
Demand Decisions that should belong to directors for all the reasons other
ordinary decision-making authority rests with them. Further Aronson’s
second prong distorts director incentives and encourages more delegation
than boards would otherwise choose.
This Article does not purport to conclusively demonstrate that
directors actually understand or respond to the incentives created by
Aronson’s second prong. Indeed, interviews with practitioners lead to the
conclusion that few directors consider demand futility tests when deciding
whether or not to delegate. Accordingly, revising the Aronson test to
function more like the Rales test may not yield significant improvement in
the delegation/management balance.
Nevertheless, the revision may provide some help in that regard.
Moreover, it would restore board authority in Demand Decisions over
which directors should be able to judge impartially. 218 At the very least, it
would make demand futility simpler and more direct—a noble goal in and
of itself.

non-wasteful decision. See Empirical Foundation at 508 (noting the entire fairness line of
cases’ “import may be to excuse demand under the second prong of Aronson”).
The Vice Chancellor describes this as a tension between Aronson and the entire
fairness line of cases. Id. at 510. Implicitly, he finds the tension being generated by the
entire fairness line. But what if the problem is really with Aronson’s overly artificial second
prong? If the demand futility test was something like the one found in Rales, it would be of
no necessary consequence that the Original Decision was not the product of a valid business
judgment. A court would simply look to find disinterest, independence, and no substantial
likelihood of personal liability. If those conditions were obtained satisfactorily, demand
would be required.
218. But see supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text (discussing non-liability-related
reasons to suspect directors’ impartiality as to Demand Decisions).

